Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1989

Patricia M. Wade v. Richard C. Burke : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John T. Caine; Richards; Caine & Allen; Attorney for Appellan.
Mark A. Larsen; Dart; Adamson & Kasting; Attorney for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Wade v. Burke, No. 890135 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1646

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

U l A f l VVSUm u r

nrn.nt.«

BRIEF
TAW
3CUMENT
r *J
)

,10
OCKET NO..

MJH3£
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PATRICIA M. WADE,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Docket No. 890135
v.
RICHARD C. BURKE,
Priority 14(b)
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
This Appeal is from Judge Homer F. Wilkinson's Order
dated December 2, 1988, Entered in the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah.

MARK A. LARSEN
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING
Attorneys for Respondent
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
JOHN T. CAINE
RICHARD, CAINE & ALLEN
Attorneys for Appellant
2568 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401

1

fe s»

if

•

3

f:*j

A^'EAl S

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PATRICIA M. WADE,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Docket No. 890135

v.
RICHARD C. BURKE,
Priority 14(b)
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
This Appeal is from Judge Homer F. Wilkinson's Order
dated December 2, 1988, Entered in the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah.

MARK A. LARSEN
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING
Attorneys for Respondent
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
JOHN T. CAINE
RICHARD, CAINE & ALLEN
Attorneys for Appellant
2568 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Description

Page

Table of Authorities

iii

Statement of Issues Presented for Review

1

Statutes Whose Interpretations are Determinative . . .

2

Statement of the Case

2

Statement of Facts

3

A.

The Divorce Proceeding Between
Ms. Wade and Mr. Burke

3

B.

Ms. Wade's Discovery of the Scheme . . .

5

C.

The Initial Proceedings Before
the District Court
Mr. Burke's and Ms. Maxwell's
Failure to Comply with Discovery . . . .
Ms. Maxwell's Perjured Testimony
Relating to Discovery

12

F.

The Aborted Settlement of the Case . . .

18

G.

The Discovery Sanction Against
Ms. Maxwell Transferring One-Half of
the Pepperwood Property to Ms. Wade. . . 19

H.

The Motion for Summary Judgment
Against Mr. Burke Quieting Title in
Ms. Wade

D.
E.

6
9

21

Summary of Argument

22

Argument

25

Point I — Mr. Burke Does Not Have Standing
to Assert the Claims Set Forth in His Motion
for Summary Judgment on Behalf of Ms. Maxwell . . 25
i

Point II — Mr. Burke's Appeal m this Case
Is Moot Because He Claims No Interest in the
Property, and the Record Owner has not Appealed
the Decision Adverse to Her Transferring Title
to One-Half of the Property to Ms. Wade

26

Point III — Against Mr. Burke, the Applicable
Statute of Limitations in this Case is the
Seven-Year Statute of Limitations Found in
Utah Code Anno. § 78-12-6 (1953)

29

Point IV — An Independent Action Seeking
Equitable Relief is not Subject to Any Statute
of Limitations: It is Only Subject to the
Doctrine of Laches

30

Point V —
In Any Event, the Three-Year Statute
of Limitations is Not Applicable to this Case
Because, in Addition to Fraud, Ms. Wade was
Suing Mr. Burke Based Upon the Provision of
the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc Awarding
Her One-Half of Any Other Property Mr. Burke
Owned

31

Point VI — Even if the Three-Year Statute of
Limitations were Applicable, the District
Court's Ruling was Correct Based Upon the
Failure of Discovery and the Failure to
Affirmatively Plead the Statute as a Defense
in the Answer .

32

Point VII — The Three-Year Statute of Limitations
Would Not Bar Ms. Wade from Proceeding with this
Action to Conclusion
35
Point VIII —
The Doctrines of Collateral
Estoppel and Res Judicata are Inapplicable
to this Case.

37

Point IX —
Mr. Burke Cannot Introduce
New Evidence into this Case on Appeal

39

Conclusion

39

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
American Coal v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 1984) . . 32
Arizona State Board of Directors for Junior
Colleges v. Phoenix Union High School District,
102 Ariz. 69, 424 P.2d 819 (1967)

27

Averbach v. Rival Manufacturing Co., 809 F.2d 1016
(3d Cir. 1987), cert, denied. 484 U.S.
(1988). . . 30
Blodgett v. Zions First National Bank, 752 P.2d 901
(Utah App. 1988)

25

Bowen v. Olson, 122 Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602, (1952). . . 38
Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928 (Utah 1980)
31
Bulloch v. United States 721 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1983),
reh'g granted. 763 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied. 474 U.S. 1086 (1986)
30Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986)

3

Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 612 P.2d 1175
(1980)

30

Merhish v. H.A. Folsom & Associates,
649 P.2d 731 (Utah 1982)

27

Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Commission,
624 P.2d 1138, 1145 (Utah 1981)

25

St. Pierre v. Edmonds 645 P.2d 615, 618 (Utah 1982). . 30
Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry,
716 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1986)
Vinson v. Marton & Associates, 159 Ariz. 1,
764 P.2d 736 (Ariz. App. 1988)
West Virginia Oil & Gas Co. v. George E. Breece Lumber
Co., 231 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1954)
iii

25
27
31

Page
York v. Unqualified Washington County Elected
Officials, 714 P.2d 679 (Utah 1986)

25

COURT RULES
U.R.C.P. 8(C)

32 & 33

U.R.C.P. 9(b)

8

U.R.C.P. 9(h)

2 & 33

U.R.C.P. 37

26 & 37

U.R.C.P. 56. .

26

U.R.C.P. 60(b)

30 & 38
STATUTES

Utah Code Anno. § 78-12-6 (1953)
Utah Code Anno. § 78-12-25 (1953, as amended)

3 & 29
32

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 7 0 (1980)

iv

38

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PATRICIA M. WADE,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Docket No. 890135
v.
RICHARD C. BURKE,
Priority 14(b)
Defendant/Appellant.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Based upon respondent Patricia M. Wade's dissatisfaction with
the Statement of Issues presented in the Brief of Appellant,
respondent Patricia M. Wade ("Ms. Wade") restates the issues in
this case as follows:
1.

Does appellant Richard C. Burke

("Mr.

Burke") have

standing to raise the statute of limitations on behalf of his
sister and co-defendant, Sandra L. Maxwell ("Ms. Maxwell"), who is
not a party to this or any other appeal?
2.

Is this appeal moot based upon Ms. Maxwell's failure to

appeal the Order and Judgment dated September 7, 1988, transferring
title of one-half of the Pepperwood property to Ms. Wade?
3.

What statutes of limitations, if any, are applicable to

the four separate counts in the Second Amended Complaint?
4.

Are the individual, separate causes of action in the

Second Amended Complaint against Mr. Burke barred by any applicable
statute of limitations?

5.

Are the causes of action in the Second Amended Complaint

barred against Mr. Burke based upon the doctrines of collateral
estoppel or res judicata?
STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATIONS ARE DETERMINATIVE
Utah Code Anno. § 78-12-6 (1953), which is quoted on page 28-29,
infra.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Ms. Wade initiated this lawsuit against her ex-husband, Mr.
Burke, his sister, Ms, Maxwell, and others, seeking one-half of a
fifteen-acre parcel of property known as the Pepperwood property.
In the event a portion of that property was awarded to Ms. Wade,
she also sought to quiet title to that portion of the property
awarded to her. Due to Ms. Maxwell's failure to comply with Courtordered discovery, the District Court entered an Order and Judgment
dated September 7, 1988, sanctioning Ms. Maxwell for her failure
to comply with discovery by transferring title to one-half of the
Pepperwood property to Ms. Wade. Ms. Maxwell failed to appeal from
the Order and Judgment.
Later, after the scheduled trial date, the District Court
entered a Summary Judgment against Mr. Burke, quieting title to the
Pepperwood property awarded to Ms. Wade in her name. The District
Court denied Mr. Burke's Motion for Summary Judgment, in which he
asserted that the action against him was barred by the three-year
statute of limitations, because it was moot and not well taken.

2

Mr. Burke appeals from the December 2, 1988, Order of the District
Court.

There are no other parties to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

A.

The Divorce Proceeding Between Ms. Wade and Mr. Burke.
On August 6, 1974, Ms. Wade filed a Complaint seeking a

divorce from Mr. Burke.

A trial in the divorce proceeding was

held in October of 1980, but it was not until January 19, 1984,
that a Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc was entered. On appeal, the
Utah Supreme Court affirmed the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc. 2
The Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc addressed five separate parcels
of real property:

(1) the Pepperwood property, which is the

subject matter of this lawsuit;3
(3) the Murray property;

(2) the Dimple Dell property;4

(4) the Namba Way property; and (5) the

Burke v. Burke, in the Third Judicial District Court, Civil
No. D-15225.
2

Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986); this case is now
before this Court on Mr. Burke's appeal from the District Court's
refusal to allow additional offsets to judgments in Ms. Wade's
favor for past-due child support totaling $18,426.91, Utah Court
of Appeals Docket No. 890371-CA. Ms. Wade filed a Motion for
Summary Disposition in this most recent appeal.
3
A map of the Pepperwood property is located at R. 382.
4
.
. . . . .
.
Wade v. Burke, in the Third Judicial District Court, Civil
No. C87-2491 (this case currently is pending before Judge Brian).
5
Advance Business Equipment v. Wade, Utah Court of Appeals
Docket No. 860070-CA (in an unpublished Memorandum Decision dated
December 7, 1987, this Court affirmed the District Court's granting
of Ms. Wade's Motion for Summary Judgment against Mr. Burke's alter
ego, Advance Business Equipment); Mr. Burke filed another lawsuit
on the Murray Property in his own name, which was dismissed with
3

Idaho property.
Advance Business Equipment, Mr. Burke's alter ego, originally
owned the Pepperwood property, and in 1976 transferred its interest
in it to Mr. Burke's sister, Ms. Maxwell, who was a defendant in
this action in the District Court.

This transfer to Ms. Maxwell

of $225,000.00 worth of property reputedly was in consideration for
unpaid secretarial work.

The Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc

specifically found that the fifteen acres of unimproved Pepperwood
property was not marital property and, therefore, took no action
concerning it. This portion of the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc
was based upon the testimony of Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell that Mr.
Burke no longer had any interest in the Pepperwood property, having
transferred it to his sister, Ms. Maxwell, prior to the trial in
the divorce proceeding.

The Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc,

however, also contained a provision awarding one-half of any other
property owned by Mr. Burke to Ms. Wade.7

prejudice:

Burke v. Wade, Civil No. C88-03813.

See Intermountain Holding Co. v. Advance Business
Equipment, Utah Court of Appeals Docket No. 870156-CA (this Court
summarily affirmed the District Court's Order denying Advance
Business Equipment's Motion to Set Aside).
7

Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc Paragraph 6, a copy of
which is attached as Exhibit A in the Addendum.
4

B.

Ms. Wade's Discovery of the Scheme.
At approximately the time the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc

was entered, Ms. Wade became concerned that other property subject
to the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc, including the properties
located on Namba Way in Murray, Utah, and at 2476 East Charles Road
in the Dimple Dell Subdivision located in Sandy, Utah, also had
been fraudulently conveyed to Ms. Maxwell. Consequently, Ms. Wade
.
ordered title reports on both properties.a The Preliminary
Title
•

9

Report on the Dimple Dell property dated September 20, 1984,
disclosed a Notice of Contract dated February 28, 1983, giving
notice of a transfer by Mr. Burke's alter ego, Advance Business
Equipment, to Mr. Burke's sister, Ms. Maxwell.
At that time, it became apparent to Ms. Wade that Mr. Burke
was involved in an effort to systematically defraud Ms. Wade of her
interest in those properties, using a similar transfer to an
identical person in an effort to thwart her ability to obtain title
to those properties.

Consequently, it did not become apparent

Affidavit of Patricia M. Wade in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment Paragraph 3 ("Wade Affidavit") (R.167175) .
o

A copy of the September 20, 1984, Title Report on the
Dimple Dell property as attached as Exhibit A to the Wade Affidavit
(R. 170-74).
Id. at Paragraph 5 (R. 168).
Id. at Paragraph 6 (R. 168).
5

until September of 1984 that Mr. Burke had defrauded the Court in
the Burke v. Burke divorce proceeding by similarly transferring the
12

Pepperwood property to his sister, Ms. Maxwell.

When Mr. Burke's

systematic fraud became apparent, Ms. Wade initiated this lawsuit
in the District Court based upon this conclusion. 13
C.

The Initial Proceedings Before the District Court.
On October 8, 1985, Ms. Wade initiated this action in the

District Court against Mr. Burke, Ms. Maxwell, Advance Business
Equipment and others alleging among other things that:

(1) Mr.

Burke and Ms. Maxwell committed fraud upon the District Court in
the Burke v. Burke case and that their testimony in that matter
was perjured; and (2) that Ms. Maxwell was holding the property in
constructive trust for Mr. Burke, and Ms. Wade was entitled to onehalf of that interest under the terms of the Decree of Divorce Nunc
Pro Tunc.

Advance Business Equipment filed bankruptcy,

and an

Amended Complaint was filed eliminating Advance Business Equipment
as a party.

12

Id. at Paragraph 7 (R. 168).

13

Id. at Paragraph 8 (R. 168-69).

14

R. 2-6.

15

R. 20-21.

16

R. 14-19.

On May 18, 1987, Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell filed a Motion to
17
•
Dismiss and

for Award of Attorneys1

Fees,

together with a

Memorandum in Support of Defendants Richard C. Burke [sic] and
Sandra L. Maxwell's Motion to Dismiss and for Award of Attorneys'
Fees. is In this motion, Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell sought to have
the Amended Complaint dismissed based upon the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel.

Ms. Wade filed Plaintiff's

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss dated
June 24, 1987.

In their Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in

Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, for the first time,
Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell alleged that the Amended Complaint failed
to state fraud with particularity as required by U.R.C.P. 9(b).
In an Order dated July 7, 1987,21the District Court denied in
part and granted in part Mr. Burke's and Ms. Maxwell's Motion to
Dismiss.

The District Court found that the prior proceeding

Burke v. Burke —

—

did not collaterally estop Ms. Wade from

proceeding in this action, but that the Amended Complaint failed
to state fraud with particularity as required by U.R.C.P. 9(b).

17

R. 43.

18

R. 44-60.

19

R. 85-91.

20

R. 99-102.

21

R. 104-05.

The Court granted Ms. Wade ten days to file a Second Amended
Complaint stating fraud with particularity, which Ms. Wade did in
22

a Second Amended Complaint dated July 10, 1987.

In Count IV of

the Second Amended Complaint, Ms. Wade also sought to have title
to one-half of the Pepperwood property quieted in the event the
23

District Court awarded it to her.
an Answer dated August 31, 1987,

Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell filed
but failed to assert as an
25

affirmative defense any statute of limitations defense.
26

In a Motion for Summary Judgment

and in a Memorandum of

Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
27

Judgment

both dated March 15, 1988, Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell

attempted to assert a statute of limitations defense and, once
again, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel as a
basis for dismissal of the action against them. Ms. Wade filed the
Affidavit of Patricia M. Wade in Opposition to Defendants' Motion
for Summary
Judgment dated March 21, 1988, ° a Memorandum in
22
R. 106-15.
23

R. 114.

24

R. 116-21.

25

R. 121.

26

R. 148-49.

27

R. 150-65.

28

R. 167-75.
8

Opposition to Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment dated March
24, 1988,29and a Rule 56(f) Affidavit30in opposition to Mr. Burke's
and Ms. Maxwell's Motion for Summary Judgment.

In the Rule 56(f)

Affidavit, Ms. Wade complained that considerable discovery was
outstanding to which Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell had not yet
responded, including three sets of interrogatories and three sets
of requests for production of documents.

Ms. Wade also protested

that the depositions of both Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell were
scheduled prior to the filing of the motion,
taken.

but had not yet been

Ms. Wade contended that the outstanding discovery would

have a bearing upon the material facts of the pending Motion for
Summary Judgment.

In an Order dated April 8, 1988,

the District

Court deferred the hearing on the Motion for a Summary Judgment of
Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell until the completion of discovery and set
the case down for a four-day trial scheduled to begin on June 27,
1988.
D

*

The trial date was later postponed until July 26, 1988.

Mr. Burke's
Discovery.

and

Ms. Maxwell's

Failure

to

Comply

with

On April 15, 1988, Ms. Wade filed a Motion to Compel against

29

R. 176-186.

30

R. 187-88.

31

See R. 143-44 & 146-47.

32

See R. 141-42.

33

R. 192-93.
9

Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell based upon their failure to comply with
the discovery outstanding at the time they filed their Motion for
Summary Judgment.34 An identical Motion to Compel was filed in a
related case over the Dimple Dell property in the Third Judicial
District Court entitled Patricia M. Wade v. Richard C. Burke, et
al., Civil No. C87-2491, before the Honorable Pat B. Brian, which
is still pending (the "Dimple Dell case").

The Dimple Dell case

is based upon Mr. Burke's transfer of the Dimple Dell property to
Ms. Maxwell after the trial but before the entry of the Decree of
Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc. The parties stipulated to be bound in the
instant case by any order entered in the Dimple Dell case because
35
the Motions to Compel were virtually identical.
As a result of the Motion to Compel filed in the Dimple Dell
case, a three-and-one-half hour hearing was held before Judge Brian
on May 18, 1988. The issues relating to the interrogatories were
resolved at the hearing, but the documents responsive to the
requests for production of documents remained outstanding.

Judge

Brian ordered Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell to produce all of the
documents requested
documents.

in Ms. Wade's requests for production of

Ms. Maxwell, however, only produced a limited number

^* R. 223-83
35

R. 320.
10

of documents.
As a result of her failure to comply with the outstanding
discovery and Judge Brian's Order, about forty-five days before the
trial was scheduled in this case, Ms. Wade filed a Motion for
37

Sanctions dated June 10, 1988.

A hearing was held on Ms. Wade's
38

Motion for Sanctions on July 8, 1988.
On July

14,

1988, the

District

Court

entered

an

Order

memorializing the July 8, 1988, hearing, which reads as follows:
1.
On or before July 13, 1988, at 5:00 p.m.,
defendant Richard C. Burke is ordered to produce all
documents in his possession or readily available to him
requested in Plaintiff's First Request for Production of
Documents to Richard C. Burke dated October 13, 1987, and
Plaintiff's Second Set of Requests for Production of
Documents to Richard C. Burke dated March 8, 1988.
2.
Defendant Sandra L. Maxwell is ordered to
produce all documents in her possession or readily
available to her requested in Plaintiff's First Request
for Production of Documents to Sandra L. Maxwell dated
September 3, 1987, Plaintiff's Second Set of Requests for
Production of Documents to Sandra L. Maxwell dated March
3, 1988, and Plaintiffs Third Set of Requests for
Production of Documents to Sandra Maxwell dated March 8,
1988.
3.
On or before July 13, 1988, at 5:00 p.m.,
defendants Richard C. Burke and Sandra L. Maxwell shall
file with the clerk's office affidavits, signed under
oath, stating that they have individually and with the
advice of counsel reviewed each of the preceding Requests
36 R. 366-67.
37 R. 319-22.
38 R. 329-30.
39 R. 336-38.
11

for Production of Documents and have fully complied by
producing to plaintiff's counsel all documents responsive
to these Requests for Production of Documents which are
either in their possession or readily available to them.
4.
In the event that either defendant Richard C.
Burke or Sandra L. Maxwell fail to comply with any
provision of this Order, . . . after determining noncompliance, the Court will strike that individual
defendant's Answer and enter judgment according to the
prayer in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint.
On July 13, 1988, Ms. Maxwell served upon Ms. Wade's counsel
an Affidavit unequivocally stating that she had produced all
documents in her possession or readily available to her to Ms.
Wade's counsel.

Mr. Burke, however, never filed or served the

affidavit required by the District Court's Order dated July 14,
1988. 41
E.

Ms. Maxwell's Perjured Testimony Relating to Discovery.
On July 13, 1988, after Ms. Maxwell served her Affidavit,

Phillip E. Maxwell, her husband, testified under oath that Ms.
Maxwell had committed perjury in several substantial aspects of
this case and had not produced all of the documents in her
possession. Mr. Maxwell's testimony demonstrated that Ms. Maxwell
had in her possession documents which she had not produced to Ms.

Ms. Maxwell's Affidavit was never filed with the Clerk's
Office as required by the Order dated July 14, 1988, and does not
appear as part of the record on appeal, but is attached as Exhibit
B in the Addendum.
Affidavit in Support of Motion to Reconsider (executed by
Ms. Maxwell's counsel Randall Richards) dated August 24, 1988, at
Paragraph 12 (R. 386-90) ("Richards Affidavit").
12

Wade's counsel, contrary to the District Court's Order dated July
14, 1988, and contrary to Ms. Maxwell's Affidavit dated July 13,
1988.42
Mr. Maxwell's deposition revealed that Ms. Maxwell blatantly
committed perjury in her deposition on several key aspects of this
case, just as she did before the District Court in the prior
divorce proceeding.

Ms. Maxwell testified that she owned the

Pepperwood property which forms the subject matter of this lawsuit
and had not transferred it to any other person.

After having

lunch with her attorney, however, her testimony changed, and she
admitted

that

she transferred

the Pepperwood

property

to a

corporation known as Trendland, Inc. Ms. Maxwell also testified
that she was not an officer or director in any other corporation,
and that she did not own any stock in any corporation other than
Advance Business Equipment.
Ms. Maxwell failed to produce any of the documents relating
to Trendland, Inc. During the pendency of this action, Ms. Maxwell

** R. 523.
43
Sandra L. Maxwell Depo. Trans, at 57 (R. 524).
44
.
.
A copy of page 61 of the Reporter's Transcript in "Patricia
M. Wade v. Richard C. Burke, et al," Civil No. C87-2491, is
attached as Exhibit A to the Memorandum in Support of Wade's Motion
for Entry of Judgment pursuant to this Court's Order dated July 14,
1988, ("Reporter's Trans.") (R. 353).
45
Id. at 22-23 (attached as Exhibit B) (R. 354).
13

transferred the Pepperwood property to Trendland, Inc., in which
she claimed a 100% ownership position. Ms. Wade, however, obtained
a copy of the Articles of Incorporation of Trendland, Inc., from
46
the Department of Business Regulation, Corporate Division.

Ms.

Maxwell's reluctance to produce even the Articles of Incorporation
for Trendland, Inc., is understandable when that document is
examined.

In her deposition, she claimed that her brother, Mr.

Burke, and his secretary were not involved in the formation or
operation of the corporation. She insisted that they w€*re neither
officers,

directors

Incorporation,

nor

however,

incorporators.4
demonstrate

that

The
this

Articles
is

of

perjured

testimony. Mr. Burke, his secretary and his son were the original
incorporators of Trendland, Inc., and Mr. Burke and his son remain
as the only officers and two of the three directors of Trendland,
48

Inc.

.

.

.

Contrary to her contention, Ms. Maxwell is not an original

incorporator of this corporation and was not a director at the time
she transferred the Pepperwood property to Trendland, Inc.
A certified copy of the Articles of Incorporation of
Trendland, Inc., is attached as Exhibit D to Wade's Motion for
Entry of Judgment pursuant to this Court's Order dated July 13,
1988 (R. 357-60).
47

Sandra L. Maxwell Depo. Trans, at 73 (R. 524).

A certified copy of the Corporation Annual Report of
Trendland, Inc., is attached as Exhibit E to Wade's Motion for
Entry of Judgment pursuant to this Court's Order dated July 13,
1988 (R. 316-62).
14

Further, despite her protestations that no stock has been
issued for Trendland, Inc., and her earlier perjured testimony that
she owned no interest in any other corporation besides Advance
Business Equipment, Ms. Maxwell did not produce any of the
corporate documents relating to Trendland, Inc., such as stock
certificates, Articles of Incorporation, minutes of Board of
Director's meetings, bank accounts, etc. She also did not produce
a copy of the Warranty Deed transferring the Pepperwood property
to her brother's

corporation, Trendland,

Inc., an extremely

critical document in this case.
Ms. Maxwell further perjured herself when she testified that
she did not own any interest in any real property other than the
Pepperwood property, the Dimple Dell property, the Namba Way
A

property, and her home.

a

Her husband, however, testified that in

June of 1985, he and Ms. Maxwell purchased a parcel of real
property located at 4318 South 4710 West, West Valley City, Utah.50
Ms. Maxwell intentionally excluded disclosing the rental property
she owned in West Valley City.

The West Valley City property was

germane to this action for two reasons:

(1) it shows that Mr. and

Mrs. Maxwell deduct their property taxes on their income tax
returns; and (2) a loan application was filled out containing

Reporter's Trans, at 60 (attached as Exhibit C) (R. 355).
Phillip E. Maxwell Depo. Trans, at 14 (R. 523).
15

financial information when they purchased that property, a document
Ms. Maxwell failed to produce.
Ms. Maxwell went into an extended, perjured farce when she
described the payment of $30,000.00 in property taxes on the
Pepperwood property. She went through an elaborate story about how
she saved $30,000.00 in cash around her house, how her husband had
contributed most of those funds, and how she gave the $30,000.00
in cash to her brother, Mr. Burke, in a conference room at St.
Benedict's Hospital in Ogden, Utah, where she works.

Mr. Burke

supposedly drove from Ogden to Salt Lake City with the $30,000.00
in cash and paid the real property taxes at the Salt Lake County
Assessor's Office. Actually, these real property taxes have never
been paid.

Not surprisingly, Mr. and Mrs. Maxwell did not deduct

a $30,000.00 payment of the Pepperwood property taxes on their 1986
Utah State or Federal Income Tax Returns, although they did deduct
property taxes paid on both their home and the West Valley City
property.

Ms. Maxwell explained the reason they did not take the

$30,000.00 deduction on their income tax return as "I just didn't" '
and "I don't have the receipt."53

Maxwell Depo. Trans, at 47-52 (R. 524).
Id. at 95 (R. 524).
Id. at 96 (R. 524).
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Phillip E. Maxwell testified that he never contributed any
funds to the payment of the property taxes for the Pepperwood
property, never had any discussions relating to the Pepperwood
property with his wife, although she described these in elaborate
54
detail, and never accumulated $30,000.00 around their house.

Mr.

Maxwell was not even aware of the existence of the Pepperwood
55

property until two days before his deposition.

He concluded that

all of Ms. Maxwell's testimony was inaccurate.

Mr. Burke, Ms.

Maxwell's brother, denies ever receiving the $3 0,000.00 in cash.
Ms. Maxwell did not produce any of the documents relating to
the West Valley City property.

These documents, however, tend to

prove that she has committed perjury

in connection with the

incredible lie about the $30,000.00 in cash she gave her brother
to pay the Pepperwood real property taxes.

She also did not

produce the loan applications for the West Valley City property,
despite Mr. Maxwell's testimony that they have a copy of it in
57

their possession.

Mr. Maxwell also testified that they had a
C Q

$20,000.00 home equity line of credit on their home,

although Ms.

54
55

Phillip E. Maxwell Depo. Trans, at 19-22 (R. 523).
Id. at 10-11 & 18 (R. 523).

56
Burke Depo. Trans, at 78-80.
57
Phillip E. Maxwell Depo. Trans, at 17 (R. 523).
58

Id. at 27 (R. 523).
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Maxwell did not produce the loan applications for that loan. These
loan applications would demonstrate that Ms. Maxwell individually
did not have the financial wherewithal to generate $30,000.00 in
cash to pay the property taxes on the Pepperwood property.
Ms. Maxwell produced the front page only of her Federal Income
Tax Returns for the years 1984 through 1987. She, however, did not
produce a single State Income Tax Return.

Also, despite the fact

that Ms. Wade's counsel forwarded IRS Form 4506 to her attorney for
execution, so that Ms. Wade could obtain full copies of her Federal
income tax returns, she refused to execute that document or produce
full copies of her tax returns.
F.

The Aborted Settlement of the Case.
The trial in this case was scheduled to begin on July 24,

1988, and continue for four days. After Mr. Maxwell's deposition,
the parties entered into settlement negotiations, and Ms. Maxwell
advised her attorney to accept Ms. Wade's offer.

In July of 1988,

orally and through their counsel, Ms. Wade and Ms. Maxwell reached
a settlement of the case.
the case had been settled.

Even Mr. Burke's attorney thought that
Based upon the agreement reached

"

Richards Affidavit Paragraph 3, 4 & 11 (R. 386-88).

60

Id.

61

Affidavit in Support of Motion to Reconsider (filed by Mr.
Burke's counsel, John T. Caine) at Paragraph 10 (R. 391-95) ("Caine
Affidavit").
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between Ms. Maxwell's counsel and Ms. Wade's counsel, the trial
62
date before the District Court was stricken.
Mr. Burke's counsel advised him not to interfere in the
settlement as its terms were appropriate.63 Mr. Burke, however,
interfered with the negotiations and placed pressure upon his
sister, Ms. Maxwell, to not execute the settlement documents.64 Ms.
Maxwell's counsel of record blamed Mr. Burke for interfering with
the settlement process, causing Ms. Maxwell to not comply with
discovery or consummate the settlement transaction.
G.
The Discovery Sanction Against Ms. Maxwell Transferring OneHalf of the Pepperwood Property to Ms. Wade.
66

On August 15, 1988, the District Court held a hearing

on Ms.

Wade's Motion for Entry of Judgment pursuant to this Court's Order
67
dated July 14, 1988.
This hearing resulted in an Order and
68

Judgment dated

September

7, 1988,

imposing

sanctions under

U.R.C.P. 37 upon Ms. Maxwell for her failure to comply with
discovery. The Order and Judgment struck Ms. Maxwell's Answer and
62
Caine Affidavit Paragraph 14 (R. 393).
63

Id. at Paragraph 13 (R. 393).
Richards Affidavit at Paragraph 13 (R. 388).

65

Id. at Paragraph 21 (R. 389).

66

R. 341.

67

R. 342-63.

68

R. 399-401; attached as Exhibit C in the Addendum.
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all affirmative defenses and entered judgment in accordance with
69

the prayer contained in the Second Amended Complaint.

The Order

and Judgment transferred one-half of the Pepperwood property to Ms.
70
•
.
Wade and imposed attorneys' fees and costs in favor of Ms. Wade
71

and against Ms. Maxwell in the sum of $5,384.35.

Ms. Wade then

recorded the Order and Judgment, which transferred to Ms. Wade
title to one-half of the Pepperwood property.
On December 28, 1988, Ms. Maxwell filed a Motion for Relief
from Judgment, together with a Memorandum in Support of Motion for
72

Relief from Judgment.

In this motion, Ms. Maxwell sought to have

the Court extend the time within which she could file a Notice of
Appeal.

The District Court denied this motion in an Order dated
73

February 17, 1989.

In a compromise, Ms. Maxwell agreed not to

appeal the District Court's Order dated February 17, 1989, denying
her Motion
for and
Relief
from Judgment
or any other
Order
by
Order
Judgment
dated September
7, 1988,
at entered
Paragraph
3 (R. 400). The District Court's action is authorized by U.R.C.P.
the
District Court in this case.
Consequently, Ms. Maxwell is not
37(b)(2)(c).
70

Id. at Paragraph 4 (R. 400).

71

Id. at Paragraph 6 (R. 401).

72

R. 475-79.

73

R. 515.

74

Partial Satisfaction of Judgment dated March 27, 1989, at
2 (appears in the record as the third from the last page in Volume
II, although it is not numbered; it is attached as Exhibit D in the
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a party to this appeal.
H.

The Motion for Summary Judgment Against Mr. Burke Quieting
Title in Ms. Wade.
On October 4, 1988, over two months after the scheduled trial
75

date, Mr. Burke refiled his Motion for Summary Judgment.

On

October 21, 1988, Ms. Wade filed Wade's Motion for Summary Judgment
76

Against Defendant Richard C. Burke,

together with a Memorandum in

Support of Wade's Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendant
.

77

Richard C. Burke.

On November 3, 1988, Ms. Wade filed a

Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Burke's Motion for Summary
Judgment, suggesting among other things, that Mr. Burke's Motion
78

for Summary Judgment was moot.

In an Order dated December 2,

1988, the District Court granted Ms. Wade's Motion for Summary
Judgment against Mr. Burke based upon Mr. Burke's claim that he had
79

no interest in the Pepperwood property.

The District Court also

denied Mr. Burke's Motion for Summary Judgment because Mr. Burke's
Addendum).
75
Defendant Burke's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion
in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Settlement dated
October 4, 1988 (R. 410-14).
76

R. 432-34.

77

R. 428-31.

78

R. 443-49.

79
Answer paragraph 37 (R. 120); Burke Depo. Trans, at 69 (R
431) .
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counsel

failed to reschedule Mr. Burke's Motion

for Summary

Judgment for hearing on a substantive basis prior to the scheduled
trail date and prior to the entering of the Order and Judgment
against Ms. Maxwell for sanctions.

In this Order, the District

Court found that Mr. Burkefs Motion for Summary Judgment was not
well taken and was moot.
This is Mr. Burke's appeal from the Order dated December 2,
1988, denying his Motion for Summary Judgment. No other defendant
in this action before the District Court, including Ms. Maxwell,
is a party to this or any other appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Burke does not have standing to raise the statute of
limitations defense on behalf of anyone other than himself.

The

holder of the title to the Pepperwood property, Ms. Maxwell, was
unable to appeal the Order and Judgment dated September 7, 1988,
and chose not to appeal the District Court's denial of her Motion
for an Extension of Time.

Mr. Burke has no standing to have the

title to the Pepperwood property transferred back to Ms. Maxwell.
The status of the title of the Pepperwood property is resolved, and
Mr. Burke, who has no standing, cannot alter it.
This, of course, makes Mr. Burke's appeal based upon the
three-year statute of limitations moot.

This Court could take no

action that would affect the title to the Pepperwood property.
Even if this Court reversed and directed the District Court to
22

dismiss the Second Amended

Complaint against Mr. Burke with

prejudice, this would not affect the title to the Pepperwood
property.
The first two counts in the Second Amended Complaint allege
fraud upon the Court.

This independent, equitable action is

subject only to the doctrine of laches and is not subject to any
statute of limitations.
In any event, the three-year statute of limitations is not
applicable to this case.

Ms. Wade's Motion for Summary Judgment

against Mr. Burke was based simply upon her prayer to quiet title
to any interest in the Pepperwood property she obtained. She could
have brought that action against Mr. Burke, who did not even appear
as a titleholder of record of the Pepperwood property, at any time
within seven years after he claimed any interest.

Mr. Burke,

however, adamantly asserts in both his pleadings, sworn testimony
and arguments before the District Court that he has no interest in
the Pepperwood property.

The District Court, therefore, was

correct in agreeing with Mr. Burke and quieting title in Ms. Wade's
name.
Further, Ms. Wade's Second Amended Complaint was not monodimensional. It contained four separate counts, only two of which
contained fraud allegations.

The third count was based upon Ms.

Wade's theory that Ms. Maxwell was holding the property in
constructive trust for Mr. Burke.

23

Under the terms of the Decree

of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc, Ms. Wade was entitled to one-half of that
interest.

If this count is subject to a statute of limitations,

it would be subject to the four-year statute of limitations.
Mr. Burke did not properly raise the statute of limitations
as an affirmative defense in his Answer, which he acknowledges he
was required to do.

Even if he properly raised it, the Court

correctly established the completion of discovery as a condition
precedent to Mr. Burke's renewal of his Motion

for Summary

Judgment. Mr. Burke never complied with the discovery in this case
and, therefore, never satisfied the condition precedent.
Not only did he not comply with discovery, but he failed to
schedule the motion for hearing before the District Court prior to
the scheduled trial date. This trial date was cancelled due to an
oral

settlement

improperly
prevented

reached

interfered
his

sister

between

the parties, but

with

that

settlement

from

executing

the

Mr. Burke

negotiation

written

and

settlement

documents. The District Court was understandably irritated at Mr.
Burke's

interference

in this process, which his own counsel

documents, and for failing to renew his motion prior to the
scheduled trial date.

24

ARGUMENT
POINT I
MR. BURKE DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO ASSERT THE
CLAIMS SET FORTH IN HIS MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON BEHALF OF MS. MAXWELL.
Mr. Burke testified in his deposition, pled in his Answer and
argued to the District Court that he has no interest in the
80

Pepperwood property.

For Mr. Burke to have standing, he must be

able to show that he has some interest in the Pepperwood property.
Without such an interest in the Pepperwood property, he cannot
suffer a distinct injury giving him a stake in the outcome of the
legal dispute: who is entitled to be the title owner of record of
the Pepperwood property?

Because Mr. Burke claimed to have no

interest in the Pepperwood property, as he pled, stated and argued,
he did not have standing to bring a Motion for Summary Judgment on
81

behalf of Ms. Maxwell.

Mr. Burke did not have standing to bring

his motion after the District Court already determined who owned
the title to the Pepperwood property.

Ms. Maxwell did not appeal

the District Court's Order and Judgment dated September 7, 1988.
Burke Depo. Trans, at 69 (R. 431); Answer at Paragraph 37
(R. 120); Transcript of Motions for Summary Judgment at 19 (R.
525) .
81

Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d
796, 799 (Utah 1986); Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Commission,
624 P.2d 1138, 1145 (Utah 1981); Blodaett v. Zions First National
Bank, 752 P.2d 901, 904-05 (Utah App. 1988); see York v.
Unqualified Washington County Elected Officials, 714 P.2d 679, 680
(Utah 1986).
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Mr. Burke cannot raise any issues relating to its entry on her
behalf.
POINT II
MR. BURKE'S APPEAL IN THIS CASE IS MOOT BECAUSE
HE CLAIMS NO INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY, AND THE
RECORD OWNER HAS NOT APPEALED THE DECISION
ADVERSE TO HER TRANSFERRING TITLE TO ONE-HALF
OF THE PROPERTY TO MS. WADE.
Mr. Burke does not claim any interest in the Pepperwood
property, although he continues to pursue this appeal. Therefore,
it is of no consequence whether any action against Mr. Burke in
this case is barred by the statute of limitations or on any other
basis.

His sister, Ms. Maxwell, did not appeal the Court's Order

and Judgment which transferred

to Ms. Wade one-half

of the

82

Pepperwood property.

Consequently, the only party who claims any

interest in the Pepperwood property in this case, Ms. Maxwell, is
content to abide by the Court's Order and Judgment.
hand, Mr. Burke —
property —

On the other

who claims no interest in the Pepperwood

attempts to pursue this appeal.

To make a ruling, this Court must have some justiciable issue
before it.

To do otherwise would violate the strong judicial

ft 0

Mr. Burke mistakenly asserts that the Order and Judgment
dated September 7, 1988, was entered against Ms. Maxwell pursuant
to U.R.C.P. 56 as a summary judgment. Brief of Appellant at 13 &
21. Actually, the District Court sanctioned Ms. Maxwell for filing
to comply with Court-ordered discovery pursuant to U.R.C.P.
37(b)(2)(B)&(C).
26

policy against rendering advisory opinions.

In determining

whether this case is moot on appeal, this Court must determine
whether any action it takes will have any effect on the parties,
84.

including Ms. Wade and Ms. Maxwell.

Any action this Court takes

in either affirming or reversing this case based upon Mr. Burke's
appeal would have no effect upon the Order and Judgment against Ms.
Maxwell.

Without disturbing the Order and Judgment against Ms.

Maxwell, who is not a party to this appeal, any direction of this
Court based upon Mr. Burke's appeal could not disturb the title to
the property:

one-half of which is now vested in Ms. Maxwell's

name and one-half of which is now vested in Ms. Wade's name.
There are only two things in Mr. Burke's favor this Court can
do:

(1) vacate the December 2, 1988, Order and remand for further

proceedings; or (2) reverse with a direction to the District Court
to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint as it relates to Mr. Burke
with prejudice.

If this Court follows the first option, the

District Court can and probably will strike Mr. Burke's Answer and
all affirmative defenses for failing to file his Affidavit required
by the District Court's Order dated July 14, 1988, and for failing

E.g., Merhish v. H.A. Folsom & Associates. 646 P.2d 731,
732 (Utah 1982).
84
E.g., Arizona State Board of Directors for Junior Colleges
v. Phoenix Union High School District, 102 Ariz. 69, 424 P.2d 819,
823 (1967); Vinson v. Marton & Associates, 159 Ariz. 1, 764 P.2d
736, 739 (Ariz. App. 1988).
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to comply with discovery.
If this Court chooses the second option, due to Ms. Maxwell's
failure to appeal the District Court's adverse Order and Judgment
against her, which transferred seven-and-one-half acres of the
Pepperwood Property to Ms. Wade, any direction this Court gave to
the District Court could not disturb the underlying rulings against
the defendants other than Mr. Burke.
that Ms. Wade's

Second

Amended

Mr. Burke can only request

Complaint

be

dismissed

with

prejudice against him: he is not in a position to assert that the
Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed against any other
defendant, such as Ms. Maxwell, the titleholder of record of one85

half of the Pepperwood property.

Because granting Mr. Burke's

appeal and vacating or reversing the District Court's Order dated
December 2, 1988, would have no effect on the title to the
Pepperwood property, Mr. Burke's appeal is moot.

Because the District Court struck Ms. Maxwell's Answer and
entered judgment against her in accordance with the prayer in the
Second Amended Complaint, this Court should accept eis true the
allegations against Ms. Maxwell contained in the Second Amended
Complaint.
28

POINT III
AGAINST MR. BURKE, THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS IN THIS CASE IS THE SEVEN-YEAR
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOUND IN UTAH CODE ANNO.
§ 78-12-6 (1953).
There are four causes of action

in the Second Amended

Complaint. After title to one-half of the Pepperwood property was
transferred to Ms. Wade in the Order and Judgment dated September
7, 1988, Mr. Burke's position in this case was the same as that of
any other defendant who did or may claim an interest in the real
property.

After the transfer of one-half of the property to Ms.

Wade, the only issue remaining against Mr. Burke was whether he had
any interest in Ms. Wade's half of the Pepperwood property.

The

first three causes of action against Mr. Burke became moot, and
only the fourth cause of action to quiet the title to the property
remained viable. Consequently, the correct statute of limitations
is contained in Utah Code Anno. § 78-12-6 (1953), entitled "Actions
or defenses founded upon title to real property," which reads as
follows:
No cause of action, or defense or counterclaim
to an action, founded upon the title to real
property or to rents or profits out of the
same, shall be effectual, unless it appears
that the person prosecuting the action, or
interposing the defense or counterclaim, or
under whose title the action is prosecuted or
defense or counterclaim is made, or the
ancestor, predecessor or grantor of such person
was seized or possessed of the property in
question within seven years before the
committing of the act in respect to which such
action is prosecuted or defense or counterclaim
made.
29

In her Motion for Summary Judgment, all Ms. Wade requested the
District Court to do was quiet title to the property against Mr.
Burke. Because Mr. Burke claimed no interest in the seven-and-onehalf acres now in Ms. Wade's name, the District Court granted Ms.
Wadefs Motion for Summary Judgment.
POINT IV
AN INDEPENDENT ACTION SEEKING EQUITABLE RELIEF
IS NOT SUBJECT TO ANY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS:
IT IS ONLY SUBJECT TO THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES.
There is no applicable statute of limitations to a cause of
action alleging fraud upon the District Court.

The doctrine of

laches and other equitable principals determines the time within
86

which the action must be commenced.
Ms.

Wade

pursued

this matter

by

independent

action

as

authorized by U.R.C.P. 60(b) in order to bring all necessary
parties before the Court, including the titleholder of record, Ms.
87
Maxwell.
Ms. Wade did not have a fair opportunity to litigate
E.g. r St. Pierre v. Edmonds. 645 P.2d 615, 618 (Utah
1982) (a copy of this case is attached as Exhibit D in the
Addendum); Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 612 P.2d 1175, 1181
(1980) .
87

There is a distinction between bringing a motion under
U.R.C.P. 60(b) (3) and bringing an independent action under U.R.C.P.
60(b) . The motion in the original case is subject to a three-month
limitation after the order or judgment is entered. The independent
action, however, is not subject to any such three-month limitation
and is only subject to the doctrine of laches. Averbach v. Rival
Manufacturing Co. , 809 F.2d 1016 (3d Cir. 1987) > cert, denied, 484
U.S.
(1988) (a copy of this case, which contains an excellent
historical discussion of independent actions attacking judgments,
is attached as Exhibit E in the Addendum); Bulloch v. United
30

the issues relating to the Pepperwood property in the Burke v.
Burke divorce proceeding.

Ms. Maxwell was not a party to that

proceeding and was beyond the power of the Court.

Fraud upon the

Court is not subject to a statute of limitations, even the threeyear statute of limitations; a fraud committed upon a Court is
subject only to the defense of laches.
In any event, the District Court has retained jurisdiction
over any property division in the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc,
88

including the Pepperwood property.
POINT V
IN ANY EVENT, THE THREE-YEAR STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE
BECAUSE, IN ADDITION TO FRAUD, MS. WADE WAS
SUING MR. BURKE BASED UPON THE PROVISION OF THE
DECREE OF DIVORCE NUNC PRO TUNC AWARDING HER
ONE-HALF OF ANY OTHER PROPERTY MR. BURKE OWNED.
The Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc awarded Ms. Wade one-half
of any other property Mr. Burke owned.

This provision was set

forth in paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc, the
same paragraph which divided other real property the parties owned
into equal parts. A separate cause of action in Count III of the

States, 721 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1983), reh'g granted, 763 F.2d 1115
(10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 1086 (1986) (in an
independent action seeking to overturn a judgment entered twentyfive years earlier, only the doctrine of laches applies); West
Virginia Oil & Gas Co. v. George E. Breece Lumber Co. , 213 F.2d 702
(5th Cir. 1954); St. Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d at 618; 7 Moore's
Federal Practice Paragraph 60.37[2] at 60-387 to 60-388.
88

E^g., Bovce v. Bovce. 609 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah 1980).
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Second Amended Complaint utilized this provision as a basis for
recovery.

Ms. Wade's theory was that Ms. Maxwell was holding the

Pepperwood property in constructive trust for Mr. Burke.

This

theory, however, was never fully developed because of Ms. Maxwell's
failure to comply with the District Court's discovery orders. The
statute of limitations on this cause of action is a four-year
89

statute of limitations,

which would not start to run, if ever,

until the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc was entered.

This

lawsuit was initiated well within four years from the date of entry
of the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc, granting Ms. Wade one-half
of any other property Mr. Burke owned.
POINT VI
EVEN IF THE THREE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
WERE APPLICABLE, THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING
WAS CORRECT BASED UPON THE FAILURE OF DISCOVERY
AND THE FAILURE TO AFFIRMATIVELY PLEAD THE
STATUTE AS A DEFENSE IN THE ANSWER.
The Answer dated August 31, 1987, fails to raise the three90

year statute of limitations as an affirmative defense.

As Mr.

Burke correctly points out, it is necessary to raise a statute of
91

limitations as an affirmative defense,
oy

which was not done in this

Utah Code Anno. § 78-12-25 (1953, as amended).

90

R. 121; contrary to the assertion in the Brief of Appellant
at 15, a statute of limitations is not jurisdictional. American
Coal Co., v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1984) (cited in the Brief
of Appellant at 15).
91

Brief of Appellant at 15; U.R.C.P. 8(c) & 9(h).
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case.

U.R.C.P. 8(c) requires the statute of limitations defense

to be plead affirmatively, and U.R.C.P, 9(h) states in part that
"it may be alleged generally that the cause of action is barred by
the provisions of the statute [of limitations] relied on, referring
to or describing such statute specifically and definitely by
section number, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise
identify the provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify
it.

.

.

."

Consequently,

without

raising

the

issue

and

specifically identifying the statute he is relying upon as an
affirmative defense in his Answer, Mr. Burke has no basis to assert
it on appeal.
Even if the statute were properly pled, the failure of
discovery in this case prevented Mr. Burke from raising it. When
Mr. Burke first filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on March 2,
1988, large amounts of discovery were outstanding, including three
sets of interrogatories and three requests for production of
documents.

Prior to the filing of Mr. Burke's Motion for Summary

Judgment on March 2, 1989, the depositions of both Mr. Burke and
Ms. Maxwell had been scheduled.

In an Order dated April 8, 1988,

the District Court allowed Ms. Wade additional time to conduct

The Brief of Appellant, however, incorrectly notes that the
statute of limitations was pled as an affirmative defense. Id. at
15-16; contra R. 121.
93

R. 192-93.
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discovery. Ms. Maxwell and Mr. Burke, however, never complied with
this discovery, which was a condition precedent to any hearing on
the statute of limitations defense.

Mr. Burke failed to file the

Affidavit required by the Court's Order dated July 14, 1988, in
which he was to declare that he had fully complied with the
discovery in this case.

Consequently, Mr. Burke did not satisfy

the condition precedent the District Court properly established
before the statute of limitations defense could be presented and,
therefore, is precluded from raising the statute of limitations
defense now.
Further, the trial in this case was scheduled for a four-day
period beginning on July 26, 1988.

Ms. Maxwell noticed up her

Motion for Summary Judgment for hearing on July 15, 1989, eleven
.

9l

94

days prior to trial.

It was stricken based upon the settlement.

Mr. Burke, however, never renewed his Motion for Summary Judgment
prior to the trial date, which was cancelled due to the settlement
of the case.

Mr. Burke improperly interfered with the execution

of the settlement documents. His interference required the parties
to continue with the case.

Consequently, because Mr. Burke never

scheduled the statute of limitations motion prior to the scheduled
trial date, never raised it in his Answer, and never complied with

R. 339.
34

the discovery which was a condition precedent to presenting the
Motion for Summary Judgment on the statute of limitations, the
District Court correctly denied Mr. Burkefs Motion for Summary
Judgment.
POINT VII
THE THREE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WOULD
NOT BAR MS. WADE FROM PROCEEDING WITH THIS
ACTION TO CONCLUSION.
The final act constituting the fraud Ms. Wade claimed Mr.
Burke and Ms. Maxwell perpetrated upon the District Court and upon
her occurred upon the filing and execution of the Decree of Divorce
Nunc Pro Tunc, which did not occur until September 19, 1984. This
formed the basis for the first two counts of the Second Amended
Complaint.

Until that final act was committed, Ms. Wade had no

basis upon which to file a lawsuit alleging fraud upon the Court.
Further, Ms. Wade could not raise this issue by way of motion.
The District Court ruled that the Pepperwood property was not
marital property and specifically took no action on it.

This

ruling apparently was based upon the transfer of the Pepperwood
property to Ms. Maxwell prior to trial.

Ms. Maxwell was not a

party to the Burke v. Burke divorce proceeding and, therefore, not
subject to the Court's rulings in that case.

The initiation of a

new action, adding all interested and necessary parties, was more
viable than any other alternative.

35

The fraud committed by Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell upon Ms. Wade
did not occur until September 19, 1984, when the Decree of Divorce
Nunc Pro Tunc was entered in the divorce proceeding between Ms.
Wade and Mr. Burke. The Utah Supreme Court in Boyce v. Boyce, 609
P.2d 928, 931 (Utah 1980), stated:
A liberal standard for application of Rule 60(b) in
divorce cases is justified by the doctrine of the
continuing jurisdiction that a divorce court has over its
decrees. Clearly, a court should modify a prior decree
when the interests of equity and fair dealing with the
court and the opposing party so require. Although the
trial court displayed great patience in dealing with this
case, we cannot avoid the conclusion, on the basis of the
contentions before this Court, that an injustice may have
been perpetrated by defendant's actions. Accordingly,
we are compelled to the conclusion that the trial judge
abused his discretion in not allowing plaintiff a hearing
under Rule 60(b).
The four-year delay between the trial in October of 1980 and
the execution of the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc dated
September 19, 1984, by the District Court was due to Mr. Burke's
counsel's failure to draft and submit the decree to the Court for
execution. Certainly, Ms. Wade cannot be held accountable for Mr.
96

Burke's inadvertence.

Otherwise, Mr. Burke could avoid any attack

upon the fraud he committed in the District Court trial simply by
holding on to the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc for a sufficient
period of time for the three-year statute of limitations to expire,
which he did.

Ms. Wade's counsel of record died in the interim.
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POINT VIII
THE DOCTRINES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND RES
JUDICATA ARE INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
Counts III and IV of the Second Amended Complaint raised new
issues never previously litigated.

Count III alleged that Ms.

Maxwell was holding property in constructive trust for Mr. Burke.
It alleged that Ms. Wade was entitled to one-half of the property
Ms. Maxwell was holding for Mr. Burke based, upon the Decree of
Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc.

Count IV was a quiet-title action.

Those

issues were never raised nor litigated in the Burke v. Burke
proceeding.

Unless

raised

and

resolved,

the

doctrines

of

collateral estoppel and res judicata are inapplicable.
The Pepperwood property was addressed in a cursory fashion in
the Burke v. Burke proceeding.
party to that proceeding.

Ms. Maxwell, however, was not a

Consequently, there was no issue in the

Burke v. Burke proceeding as to whether Ms. Maxwell fraudulently
obtained title to the Pepperwood property.

The District Court

simply was unable to resolve issues about third parties not joined
in the Burke v. Burke divorce proceeding.
Finally, the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata
do not arise in situations where a party is claiming in an
independent action that fraud has been committed upon the Court.
Ms. Wade has a right to maintain an independent cause of action on
that theory. Count I of the Second Amended Complaint is based upon

37

U.R.C.P. 60(b) and essentially alleges that Mr. Burke and Ms.
Maxwell perjured themselves relating to the transaction between
them transferring the title of the property from Advance Business
Equipment to Ms. Maxwell.

U.R.C.P. 60(b) states in part:

"This

rule does not limit the power of the court to entertain an
independent action tc relieve a party from a judgment, order or
proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.
The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action."
Ms. Wade chose to pursue this matter, as the rule allows, by
an independent action.

This is not a collateral attack; it is a

direct attack upon the judgment based upon allegations that the
97

judgment was procured through the use of fraud.

The Utah Supreme

Court in St. Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982), expressly
recognized as proper an independent action based upon fraud as a
proper means of attacking a previously entered Decree of Divorce.
To suggest that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes an
independent

action

for

fraud

under U.R.C.P.

60(b) would

be

tantamount to writing the clause preserving independent actions out
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Accordingly, the doctrines

of res judicata and collateral estoppel are not applicable in this
case.
y/

Bowen v. Olson, 122 Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602, 604 (1952);
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 70 (1980).
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POINT IX
MR. BURKE CANNOT INTRODUCE NEW EVIDENCE INTO
THIS CASE ON APPEAL.
The Brief of Appellant quotes extensively from what appears
to

be

a

trial

proceeding.

transcript

of

the

Burke

v.

Burke

divorce

This quote is not part of the record on appeal.

This trial transcript was never introduced into the evidence before
the District Court in this case. Mr. Burke's attempt to introduce
it as evidence at this late date is inappropriate.
well knows,

As Mr. Burke

the preparation and introduction of that trial

transcript during the course of the proceedings was necessary to
introduce it into evidence.

Mr. Burke never made any attempt to

do so, and the trial transcript in the Burke v. Burke proceeding
does

not

appear

in

the

record

on

appeal

in

this

case.

Consequently, this Court should not consider it in ruling upon this
appeal.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Burke and Ms. Maxwell failed to comply with Court-ordered
discovery, despite repeated opportunities to do so. This resulted
in a sanction against Ms. Maxwell, striking her answer and all
affirmative defenses, entering judgment against her in accordance
with the prayer of the Second Amended Complaint, and imposing

Brief of Appellant at 4-10.
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986).
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attorneys1 fees and costs upon her.
sanction.

She did not appeal from that

Mr. Burke, however, who has no standing to raise any

issue on behalf of his co-defendant, Ms. Maxwell, continues to
pursue this appeal.

Because this Court could take no action that

would affect the title to the Pepperwood property as a result of
Mr. Burke's appeal, his appeal is moot.
Counts I and II of the Second Amended Complaint are an
independent action pursuant to U.R.C.P. 60(b).

This independent,

equitable action is subject only to the doctrine of laches. Even
if subject to the three-year statute of limitations, the statute
of limitations could not begin to run until the Decree of Divorce
Nunc Pro Tunc was entered in 1974. Under any scenario, therefore,
the action was commenced in a timely manner.

These counts are a

direct attack against the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc, not a
collateral one.
Count III of the Second Amended Complaint, however, was not
an attack upon the Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc.

It was based

upon a provision of the Decree awarding one-half of any other
property Mr. Burke owned.

The theory of recovery was that Ms.

Maxwell held the Pepperwood property in constructive trust for Mr.
Burke, and Ms. Wade was entitled to one-half of the property so
held.

This cause of action, therefore, was subject to at least a

four-year statute of limitations. This count was not raised in any
prior proceedings and, therefore, could not be subject to the
40

doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel.
Count IV of the Second Amended Complaint, which sought to
quiet title against Mr. Burke, was the only remaining cause of
action against Mr. Burke after Ms. Maxwell was sanctioned because
the first three counts became moot.

If this count is subject to

a statute of limitations, it is subject to a seven-year statute of
limitations, which did not begin to run until Ms. Wade obtained
title to one-half of the Pepperwood property. Likewise, this count
was not raised in any prior proceeding.

Consequently, it is not

subject to the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel.
All of the District Court's rulings in this case are proper
and based upon undisputed facts.

This Court, therefore, should

affirm the District Court's Order dated December 2, 1988, and
should award Ms. Wade her costs on this appeal.
Dated:

July 3, 1989.
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING

*5ark*sA</ Lapgen

Attorney^for Respondent
Patricia M. Wade

41

ADDENDUM

j«.;hn T. Caino of
KICHAKDS, CAINE f. RICHARDS
Attorney for Defendant
256*i Washington Boulevard
Oqtl«n, Utah 34 4 01
Telephone: 39 3-5 367

IN TH1-: DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
::ATKiC TA ?•',. BUfcKK,
Plaintiff,

:
:

v n.

DECREE OF DIVGKCE
NUNC PRO TUNC
Civil No. D-15225

\7^

lutL
'id
r v /

RICHARD C. BURKE,
Defendant.

The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on
the 24th day of October, I960, before the Honorable .Ernest R.
Baldwin, judge of the above entitled court, sitting without a
jury, and plaintiff being personally present and represented by
counsel, Gerald Gundry, and defendant being personally present
and represented by counsel, John T. Caine, and testimony having
been taken over a period of two days, and the court also
requesting the filing of written memorandum, and after reviewing
all of the evidence and the memorandums of the parties, and the
court being fully advised in the premises, and having heretofore
signed and entered herein its findings of fact and conclusions of
law, NOW, THEREFORE,
ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:

EXHIBIT A

1.

That the parties were previously divorced by this eourt.

on September 16, 1977, and the court;, therefore, for the purpose
OL: this hearing, was to dispose of the marital property.
2.

That the plaintiff shall be awarded the custody or the

parties' two minor children, subject; to reasonable visitation in
the defendant.
3.

That judgment shall be entered against the defendant for
£?<^Vo L^e^j L *? <* O

So,900 for child supper* arrearage :;o dateo/.
4.

*^3
That the plaintiff shall not be awarded any alimony now

or in the future.
5.

That plaintiff shall be awarded the home at 4590 South

785 East, Salt Lake City, Utah.

The defendant shall be awarded

the adjoining acreage to the home.

That each party shall assume

and discharge any debt against the property and hold the other
harmless therefrom.
60

That the building lot in Dimple Del Subdivision #2 and

j

the cabin site in Island Park, Idaho", ^haxl be awarded equally rto I

the parties. &-*£- &JZ&^^sf>^^^
7.

^

^

c

^

That the 15 acres of unimproved property knowrC^s Pepper j ^ j

Wood is not marital property, and, therefore, no action shall be
taken by the court concerning its disposition.
8.

That the plaintiff shall be awarded all of the

furniture, fixtures and wares located in her possession with the
exception of the following items currently in her possession,
which shall be awarded to the defendant:

the Navaho Indian rug,

the Remington prints, a set of silver prints, a painting of a sea
scape, a plaintiff of an Indian, a book of the Old West, all of

which shall be awarded to the defendant.

In addition, defendant

shall be awarded his grandmother • «; orass bell, an Indian
ceremonial rug, one of the three other Indian rugs, three pen
sketches, three Hafen family history hooks and one-half oi all of
the photographs.
9.

That defendant shall be awarded all of Ins interest in

the company known as Advanced Business Equipment.
10.

That each party shall asruur*? ami discharge their own

attorney's fees and costs incurred in this action and hold the
other harmless therefrom.

S^/^^^

DATED t h i s _ 2 L day ofKcgus-r.
/yZO.

•

1984. ~ / f / ^ V ^ / v V ^

, A THE COURT:

fEST F. BALDWIN X^JR.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

*

#

•

O^^O^c^.^

RANDALL W. RICHARDS, #4503
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN
Attorney for Defendant Maxwell
2568 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 399-4191
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PATRICIA M. WADE,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF SANDRA L. MAXWELL

vs.
RICHARD C. BURKE, SANDRA
L. MAXWELL, et al.,
Defendants.

Judge:

Homer F. Wilkinson

Civil No. C85-6773

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF WEBER

)

ss.

SANDRA L. MAXWELL, being first duly sworn upon her oath, depose
and states:
1.

I am one of the defendants in the above entitled action.

2.

That I have produced all of the documents that have been

requested that I have access to.
DATED this

S O

IQI

day of July, 1988.

SANDRA L. MAXWELL, Defendant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a Notary Public, this
day of July, 1988.
Residing At:

ZiDr

5 zS
d O

My Commissio
ussxon Expi res:

//t/fo

3 *I

I; a
J

5gS

till

EXHIBIT B

Ogden, Utah

/J

SeU Lake Couniy^

SEP If V&B
MARK A. LARSEN

DART, ADAMSON & KASTING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main St., Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

<£ /t3£<?
/€-/?-#&

PATRICIA M. WADE,
Plaintiff,

ORDER and JUDGMENT

v.

Civil No. C85-6773

RICHARD C. BURKE, e t

al.,

£L
&:Q6 A-W

Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.

On August 15, 1988, at 8:30 a.m., Plaintiff's Motion for
Entering Judgment Pursuant to this Court's Order Dated July
14, 1988, came on for a special hearing before the abovecaptioned Court, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding.
Mark A. Larsen appeared and represented plaintiff Patricia M.
Wade.

After receiving proper notice, defendant Sandra L.

Maxwell failed to appear personally or through her counsel of
record, but John S. Adams appeared and entered his appearance
on her behalf.

The Court waited for twenty minutes until

8:50 a.m. for Ms. Maxwell or her counsel of record, Randall
Richards, to arrive, all to no avail. After entertaining the
oral argument of counsel, reviewing the file, reviewing the
Memorandum in Support Wade's Motion for Entry of Judgment
Pursuant to this Court's Order Dated July 14, 1988, the
EXHIBIT C

deposition transcripts of Richard C. Burke, Sandra L. Maxwell
and Phillip E. Maxwell, and all other documents contained in
the file, and the Court being fully advised, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:
1.

Based upon the stipulation of counsel, Ms. Wade's

oral motion to short the time to respond to Ms. Wade's Motion
for Entry of Judgment Pursuant to This Court's Order Dated
July 14, 1988, is granted, and the Court finds that notice to
Ms* Maxwell of this Motion was proper.
2.

Plaintiff Patricia M. Wade's Motion for Entry of

Judgment Pursuant to this Court's Order Dated July 14, 1988,
is granted.
3.

Ms. Maxwell's Answer and all affirmative defenses

contained in it are stricken, and judgment is entered against
Ms. Maxwell in part in accordance with the prayer contained
in Ms. Wade's Second Amended Complaint.
4.

Ms. Wade is awarded all right, title and interest

of defendant Sandra L. Maxwell ("Ms. Maxwell") held in the
property forming the subject-matter of this lawsuit, located
in Salt Lake County, Utah, and more particularly described as
follows ("the Property"):
Commencing 80 rods West and 16 rods South, and 3 0
rods West from the Northeast corner of section 22,
township 3 South, range 1 east, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian and running thence South 660 feet; thence
West 30 rods; thence North 660 feet; thence East 3 0
rods to the point of beginning.
5.

The transfer of title to the Property described in
2

the preceding paragraph from Sandra L. Maxwell to Patricia M.
Wade is retroactive to November 7, 1985, at 4:13 p.m. , the
date and time of the recording of the Lis Pendens in the
above-captioned case with the Salt Lake County Recorder's
Office as Entry No. 4161446 in Book 5707 at Page 2116, and
all parties claiming any interest in the Property described
in the preceding paragraph as a result of a transfer after
November 7, 1985, at 4:13 p.m., are divested of any all such
interest in the Property, title to which is quieted in the
name of plaintiff Patricia M. Wade.
6.

A judgment is entered in favor of Ms. Wade and

against Ms. Maxwell in the sum of $5,384.35, which represents
reasonable attorneys' fees in the sum of $2,153.25 and costs
in the sum of $3,231.10, all of which were incurred in order
to prove that Ms. Maxwell committed perjury in the testimony
given in her deposition.
7.

This Order is not intended to and does not affect

the rights, title and interest of the remaining defendants in
the Property.
Dated:

0

August

^_ , 1988.
BY THE COURT:

- • /\^~-

Y '/*

Jfomer F. Wilkinson
^JiT"" D i s t r i c t Court Judge
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to redeem the property, which she did, the
[4] After reviewing the record in this
second attorney did not effect a redemption case, we conclude that reasonable minds
and the redemption period expired. The could differ on the question of whether the
client's action against this second attorney attorney's actions in this matter measured
was settled for $4,000 during the trial, and up to the standard of care required of attoris not before us on appeal.
neys in their professional duties. We thereOn this appeal from the granting of sum- fore reverse the summary judgment and
mary judgment to the first attorney, the remand the case for trial on that issue.
client contends that the record disclosed a Costs to appellant.
genuine issue of fact, specifically, whether
HALL, C. J., and STEWART, HOWE and
the defendant exercised "due care in perDURHAM,
JJ., concur.
forming the duties reasonably to be expected of an attorney under the circumstances."
[1] An attorney is required to possess
the legal knowledge and skills common to
members of his profession, Young v. Bridwell, 20 Utah 2d 332, 338, 437 P.2d 686, 690
(1968), and to represent his client's interests
with competence and diligence. Dunn v.
McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman,
Utah, 584 P.2d 894, 896 (1978).

O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^

Sandra ST. PIERRE, Plaintiff
and Appellant,

[2,3] Ordinarily, whether a defendant
has breached the required standard of care
is a question of fact for the jury. FMA
Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Insurance Co.,
Utah, 594 P.2d 1332 (1979); Jensen v. Dolen, 12 Utah 2d 404, 367 P.2d 191 (1962).
Consequently, a motion for summary judgment should be denied where the evidence
presents a genuine issue of material fact
which, if resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, would entitle him to judgment as
a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 29 Utah 2d
184, 506 P.2d 1274 (1973); University Club
v. Invesco Holding Corp., 29 Utah 2d 1,504
P.2d 29 (1972).1 A genuine issue of fact
exists where, on the basis of the facts in the
record, reasonable minds could differ on
whether defendant's conduct measures up
to the required standard. Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126
(1967); FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby
Insurance Co., supra.
1. In contrast, a motion for summary judgment
may be granted where the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, admissions, and answers to
interrogatories, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that no
genuine issue of material fact exists and that

v.
Stanley W. EDMONDS, Defendant
and Respondent
No. 17075.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 19, 1982.
Ex-wife brought action alleging that
ex-husband used harassment, threats of
bodily harm and physical abuse and intimidation to force her to sign documents which
resulted in substantially reducing her share
in property settlement in divorce action and
in preventing her from contesting allegations in divorce complaint and sought damages or, alternatively, imposition of constructive trust. The Fifth District Court,
Washington County, J. Harlan Burns, J.,
dismissed amended complaint, and ex-wife
appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J.,
held that complaint did state claim upon
which relief could be granted.
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Bihlmaier
v. Carson, Utah, 603 P.2d 790 (1979); Livingston Industries, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust
Co., Utah. 565 P.2d 1117 (1977).
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Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.

1. Divorce e=>254(2)
Although court has continuing jurisdiction over its decree in divorce proceeding
for alimony, support, and division of property, motion to modify decree must be made
in original action and allege changed circumstances sufficient to warrant a reopening. U.C.A.1953, 30-5-5.
2e Divorce <s=>254(2)
Where ex-wife's claim was that ex-husband used harassment, threats of bodily
harm and physical abuse, and intimidation
to force her to sign documents which resulted in substantially reducing her share in
property settlement in divorce action and in
preventing her from contesting allegations
in divorce complaint, ex-wife did not plead
change of circumstances and therefore was
not entitled to have divorce decree modified. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.
3. Judgment <8=>386(1)
Rule authorizing trial court to relieve
party from final judgment or decree procured by fraud if motion is made within
three months after judgment does not limit
power of court to entertain independent
common-law action to set aside judgment or
decree for fraud or duress after threemonth period has expired. Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 60(b).
4. Judgment <*=>456(1)
Doctrine of laches and other equitable
principles determine time within which independent common-law action to satisfy
judgment or decree for fraud or duress
must be brought
5. Judgment <*=»372> 443(1)
Extrinsic fraud arises from acts preventing fair submission of case for adjudication and intrinsic fraud refers to matters
occurring during course of proceedings,
such as false testimony during trial, which
may have influenced the judgment.

6. Judgment <s=>372
Drawing distinction between extrinsic
and intrinsic fraud in deciding whether independent action for relief from prior judgment lies has little merit and distinction
should be abandoned in determining when
independent action may lie to set aside
judgment or decree on ground that it was
obtained by fraud, overruling Clissold v.
Clissold, 30 Utah 2d 430, 519 P.2d 241, to
extent that it is contrary to holding.
7. Divorce <s=>165(3)
Intentional act by party in divorce action which prevents; opposing party from
making full defense amounts to fraud upon
opposing party, as well as upon justice, justifying court in setting aside decree so
obtained.
8. Judgment <*»90, 375
When fraud or duress are properly
pleaded, it is not important whether decree
is entered after litigation or by consent
9. Divorce <*=»165(5%)
Ex-wife's complaint alleging that exhusband used harassment, threats of bodily
harm and physical abuse, and intimidation
to force her to sign documents which resulted in substantially reducing her share in
property settlement in divorce action and in
preventing her from contesting allegations
in divorce complaint and wherein she
sought damages or, alternatively, imposition of constructive trust on ex-husband's
property stated claim upon which relief
could be granted.
David Nuffer, St. George, for plaintiff
and appellant.
Phillip L. Foremaster, St. George, for defendant and respondent.
STEWART, Justice:
Plaintiff appeals the district court's order
dismissing her amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted. We reverse and remand for
further proceedings.
In reviewing the dismissal of a complaint
for failure to state a claim, we assume the
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plaintiffs allegations to be true and construe them and the reasonable inferences
arising therefrom liberally in determining
whether a claim for relief has been stated.
Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 398
?J2d 207 (1965); Heathman v. Hatch, 13
Utah 2d 266, 372 ?J2d 990 (1962).
On March 23, 1978, a complaint seeking a
divorce and a division of the marital estate
was filed. Sandra Edmonds (now St
Pierre) was the named plaintiff and Stanley
W. Edmonds the named defendant Edmonds9 attorney drafted the original divorce pleadings naming St Pierre as the
complaining party. Edmonds executed and
filed an acknowledgment of service, consent
to default, and a waiver of appearance in
the original action; and both parties entered into a property settlement agreement
On April 11, 1978, the court entered a
default judgment against Edmonds. On
April 21,1978, another attorney retained by
Edmonds appeared before the district court
and moved to withdraw Edmonds' consent
to the default and filed an answer and
counterclaim, an acknowledgment, a consent and waiver signed by St. Pierre, and a
property settlement stipulation executed by
both parties. The stipulation greatly reduced the property awarded St. Pierre.
Based on these documents, the court granted the divorce and divided the marital estate according to the terms of the stipulation.
On January 14, 1980, St Pierre initiated
this action. In an amended complaint, she
alleges that Edmonds used harassment,
threats of bodily harm and physical abuse,
and intimidation to force her to sign the
documents which resulted in substantially
reducing her share in the property settlement in the divorce action and in preventing her from contesting the allegations in
the divorce complaint By way of relief,
she seeks damages in the amount of that
1. In Land v. Land, Utah, 605 P.2d 1248 at 1251
(1980), we held that a decree for the division of
property based on a voluntary stipulation may
be modified only in unusual circumstances not
present here. The Court stated:
. . . Accordingly, the law limits the continuing jurisdiction of the court where a property

portion of the marital estate that she claims
she should have had, i.e., $150,000, or, alternatively, imposition of a constructive trust
on the defendant's property. She also
seeks, in the alternative, an order setting
aside the property division in the decree and
a new distribution of the marital assets as
provided in the first property settlement
agreement
In dismissing the complaint, the district
court stated:
. . . it appeaifed] to the Court that the
First Cause of Action represents facts
which, if substantiated by credible evidence would support intrinsic fraud upon
the Court in Civil No. 6665, Sandra Edmonds v, Stanley W. Edmonds, divorce
action, and more properly heard under
30-3-5, subparagraph 1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in a divorce
case . . . .
[1,2] In this action plaintiff alleged
common law claims which were independent claims for relief, in addition to the
attempt to modify the divorce decree itself.
Clearly she was not entitled to a modification of the divorce decree pursuant to
§ 30-3-5. Although a court has continuing
jurisdiction over its decree in a divorce proceeding for alimony, support, and the division of property,1 a motion to modify the
decree must be made in the original action
and allege changed circumstances sufficient
to warrant a reopening. Crofts v. Crofts,
21 Utah 2d 332, 445 P.2d 701 (1968). The
plaintiff in this action did not plead a
change in circumstances and therefore was
not entitled to have the decree modified.
Nor could plaintiff obtain relief based on
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because the time had expired for filing
a motion to set the decree aside.
[3] Rule 60(b) authorizes the trial court,
on motion, to relieve a party from a final
settlement agreement has been incorporated
into the decree, and the outright abrogation
of the provisions of such an agreement is
only to be resorted to with great reluctance
and for compelling reasons.
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judgment or a decree procured by fraud,
whether intrinsic or extrinsic, but only if
the motion is made within three months
after the judgment That rule, with its
short time limitation, does not, however,
limit the power of a court to entertain an
independent common law action to set aside
a judgment or decree for fraud or duress
after the three-month period has expired.
Indeed, Rule 60(b) expressly recognizes and
preserves the court's historic powers to relieve a party from the operations of an
unconscionable judgment or order. "It remains clear, as it has from the beginning,
that Rule 60(b) does not limit the power of
a court to entertain an independent action/'
7 Moore's Federal Practice, § 60.31 at 502
(2d ed. 1979).
The well established and fundamental
doctrines designed to establish the stability
of judgments and decrees must yield to the
overriding principle that in our system of
justice the essential integrity of the adjudicatory process must be preserved. One who
would destroy that integrity cannot plead
as a defense that his fraud on the system of
justice must be protected in the name of
preserving judgments. Thus, it has long
been recognized by state and federal courts
alike that an independent equitable action
for relief from a prior judgment is available
in addition to those remedies afforded under Rule 60(b). E.g., Bizzell v. Hemingway,
548 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1977); Kodekey Electronics Inc. v. Mechanex Corporation, 500
F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1974); Anderson v. State
Department of Highways, Alaska, 584 P.2d
537 (1978); Perper v. Pima County, 123
Ariz. 439, 600 P.2d 52 (1979); Dudley v.
Keller, 33 Colo.App. 320, 521 P.2d 175
(1974); Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho
328, 612 P.2d 1175 (1980); Selway v. Burns,
150 Mont. 1, 420 P.2J G40 (1967); Dunham
v. First National Bank in Sioux Falls, 86
S.D. 727, 201 N.W.2d 227 (1972); Jerkins v.
McKinney, Tenn., 533 S.W.2d 275 (1976).
See also 11 Wright and Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure, § 2868 (1973); 7
Moore's Federal Practice, §§ 60.31,60.36 (2d
ed. 1979); Moore, Federal Relief from Civil
Judgments, 55 Yale LJ. 623 (1946).

[4] Nonetheless, even when there is
fraud in obtaining a judgment, there must
be some limit on the bringing of an action
to set the judgment aside. The time limitation in Rule 60(b), however, does not control
the filing of an independent action. Rather, the doctrine of latches and other equitable principles determine the time within
which the action must be brought. Kg.,
Compton v. Compton, supra; Selway v.
Burns, supra; Dunham v. First National
Bank in Sioux Falls, supra; 7 Moore's Federal Practice, § 60.33 (2d ed. 1979); 11
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2868 (1973).
The availability of an independent action
for setting aside a judgment has been said
to rest on whether the fraud alleged is
"intrinsic" or "extrinsic." The distinction
between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud originated in United States v. Throckmorton, 98
U.S. 61, 25 L.Ed. 93 (1878), where the Court
held that the fraud that was the basis of an
independent action for relief must be extrinsic rather than intrinsic. However,
thirteen years later, Marshall v. Holmes,
141 U.S. 589, 12 S.Ct 62, 35 L.Ed. 870
(1891), declared the "settled doctrine" that
relief from a prior judgment would lie
whenever it is "against conscience to execute a judgment" and the party seeking
relief is without fault.
[5] Extrinsic fraud arises from acts preventing the fair submission of the case for
adjudication. Clissold v. Clissold, 30 Utah
2d 430, 519 P.2d 241 (1974); Auerbach v.
Samuels, 10 Utah 2d 152, 349 P.2d 1112
(1960). Intrinsic fraud refers to matters
occurring during the course of the proceedings, such as false testimony during the
trial, which may have influenced the judgment. Clissold ve Clissold, supra, Crouch v.
McGaw, 134 Tex. 633, 138 S.W.2d 94 (1940).
Needless to say, the line between the two is
neither straight nor bright.
We recognize that a number of courts
continue to adhere to the Throckmorton
distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic
fraud. However, a number of other courts
have abandoned the distinction and recognize an independent claim for relief from
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judgments for both extrinsic and intrinsic rected at her by Edmonds. Relying on the
fraud. E.g., Bussey v. Bussey, 95 N.H. 349, alleged acknowledgment, waiver and con64 A.2d 4 (1949) (divorce case). Boring v. sent, the district court granted Edmonds a
Ott, 138 Wis. 260, 119 N.W. 865 (1909), default divorce and divided the marital
(approved in 22 Harv.L.Rev. 600 (1909)); property pursuant to the agreement tenLaun v. Kipp, 155 Wis. 347, 145 N.W. 183 dered by him. Assuming plaintiff's allega(1914). Publicker v. Shallcross, 106 P.2d tions to be true, as we must at this point,
949, 952 (3rd Cir. 1939), cert, denied, 308 she was prevented by defendant's duress
U.S. 624, 60 S.Ct. 379, 84 L.Ed. 521 (1940). from presenting her evidence to the trial
[6] Drawing a distinction between ex- court in the divorce proceeding.
trinsic and intrinsic fraud in deciding
[7] An intentional act by a party in a
whether an independent action for relief divorce action which prevents the opposing
from a prior judgment lies, has little merit party from making a full defense "amounts
Professors Wright and Miller state that, to fraud upon the opposing party, as well as
"[s]ince there is iittle real basis for the upon justice, justifying a court in setting
distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic aside the decree so obtained." [Citations
fraud/ it would be unfortunate if the an- omitted.] Berg v. Berg, 22fl Minn. 173,175,
cient learning on this point were to be 34 N.W.2d 722, 724 (1948). Duress and
resurrected as a limitation on independent fraud are commonly held sufficient to vaactions now that it is at last decently buried cate a property settlement in a divorce dewith regards to motions." [Footnotes omit- cree. Cary v. Gary, 257 Ala. 431, 59 So.2d
ted.] 11 Wright & Miller, § 2861 at 196
659 (1952). "Public interest requires that
(1931). A survey of the cases supports the
no spouse be defrauded or coerced by the
observation that:
other in obtaining a decree of divorce."
The perpetuation of this extrinsic-intrinGuzzo v. Guzzo, 269 Wis. 21, 2&-29, 68
sic distinction has led the federal courts
N.W.2d 559, 563 (1955). In Anno. 157
into a thicket of inconsistency, because
A.L.R. 6, 80 (1945) it is stated:
the distinction is unnecessary, often irraDuress as a ground for setting aside a
tional, and potentially productive of indefault judgment of divorce has been frejustices not outweighed by the interests
quently bracketed by the courts with
of finality. [Rule 60(b): Survey and Profraud. Generally speaking, the courts
posal for General Reform, 60 Cal.L.Rev.
will, as in the case of fraud
exercise
531, 542 (1972).]
their power and set aside a judgment
We agree that the extrinsic-intrinsic disobtained by duress.
tinction fails to provide a rational basis for
[8] When fraud or duress are properly
the harsh legal consequences which flow
pleaded,
it is not important whether the
from it. We, therefore, decline to deterdecree
is
entered after litigation or by conmine whether the allegations in the comsent
Civic
Western Corporation v. Zila
plaint constitute the equivalent of extrinsic
Industries,
Inc.,
66 Cal.App.3d 1, 135 Cal.
or intrinsic fraud and hold that the distinction should be abandoned in determining Rptr. 915 (1977); Parke v. Parke, 72 Idaho
when an independent action may lie to set 435, 242 P.2d 860, 863 (1952).
aside a judgment or decree on the ground
[9] The claim in this case is for damages
that it was obtained by fraud.2
and in the alternative for a constructive
Plaintiff alleges that her waiver of appearance and her execution of the second
settlement agreement resulted directly
from physical and mental intimidation di2. To the extent that Chssold v Chssold 30
Utah 2d 430, 519 P2d 241 (1974) is contrary to

trust to be imposed on the assets awarded
defendant that had been part of the marital
estate. In a narrow sense, therefore, the
daim for relief does not seek to set the
this holding, it is overruled.

620

Utah

645 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

decree aside, although it is clear that the
action attacks the property distribution
made under the decree and therefore, the
decree itself. Since, as we have held, a
claim for relief was stated that could have
resulted in setting the decree aside, it follows that the less drastic remedy sought in
this case does not preclude the action. In
sum, plaintiffs allegations of duress state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.
Affirmed as to the motion to modify and
reversed in all other respects and remanded
for further proceedings. Costs to appellant.
HALL, C. J., and OAKS and HOWE, JJ.,
concur.
DURHAM, J., does not participate herein.
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NORTH PARK BANK OF COMMERCE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Vc

Donald G. NICHOLS and Joseph H.
Bottum, Defendants and Appellant
No. 17498.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 22, 1982.
Guarantor of loan appealed from a
judgment of the First District Court, Cache
County, VeNoy Christopherson, J., holding
him jointly liable with borrower for the
balance due on three promissory notes
signed by borrower. The Supreme Court,
Hall, C. J., held that guarantor was liable
for the entire balance owed by borrower to
lender on three separate loans even though
guarantor had only guaranteed the first
loan where the agreement signed by guarantor stated that guarantor agreed to guarantee payment of all obligations of borrower to lender "now existing or which may

thereafter arise," and where the agreement
was to "encompass future accommodations
and indebtednesses" of borrower, in that
such language was unambiguous as to guarantor's liability with respect to borrower's
future obligations.
Affirmed and remanded.
Guaranty <s=»36(l)
Guarantor of loan was liable for entire
balance due by borrower to lender on original loan and two subsequent loans where
guarantor had agreed in agreement to
guarantee payment when due of any and all
obligations of borrower to lender "now existing or which may thereafter arise," and
where agreement was to "encompass future
accommodations and indebtednesses" of
borrower, in that such language was unambiguous as to guarantor's liability with respect to borrower's future obligations.
C. C. Patterson, Ogden, for Bottum.
Frank M. Wells, Ogden, for Nichols.
Walter G. Mann, Bngham City, for plaintiff and respondent.
HALL, Chief Justice:
Defendant Joseph H. Bottum appeals a
judgment holding him jointly liable with
defendant Donald G. Nichols for the balance due on a total of three promissory
notes signed by Nichols
Nichols borrowed $40,000 from plaintiff
North Park Bank of Commerce on December 15, 1976, executing a promissory note
and pledging 130,000 shares of Ametek
stock as collateral. As additional security,
appellant Bottum signed an agreement
promising to personally guarantee payment
of the loan. On January 7, 1977, plaintiff
loaned Nichols an additional $5,000 without
obtaining further security.
Nichols' original promissory note fell due
on March 15, 1977, and his $5,000 note fell
due on April 7, 1977. However, as of April
21, 1977, Nichols had paid only the interest
on these notes. At that time, Nichols
signed a new promissory note for the entire
$45,000 principal.
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Sylvia AVERBACH, Appellant,
v.
RIVAL MANUFACTURING CO.
No. 86-1196.
United States Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit
Argued Oct 14, 1986.
Decided Jan. 20, 1987.
Action was brought seeking relief
from judgment in products liability action.
The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Daniel H.
Huyett, 3rd, J., dismissed complaint and
plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Gibbons, Chief Judge, held that (1) plaintiff failed to state RICO cause of action
based on manufacturer's false answers to
interrogatories in lawsuit, and (2) plaintiffs
fraud action against manufacturer based
on manufacturer's false answers to interrogatories stated cause of action for fraud.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded.
1. Commerce «=»82.70
The court may be an enterprise within
the meaning of Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1961 et seq.
2. Commerce <&»82.72
Plaintiffs allegation that defendant,
by serving through mail its false answers
to interrogatories, engaged in a pattern of
racketeering activity, thereby disrupting
court processes, did not state cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, where litigants before court did not share with court's personnel a common purpose with respect to
the activity complained of. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1962(c).
3. Federal Courts «=»542
In view of that fact that plaintiffs
claim on its face may have satisfied requirements of statute which confers diver-

EXHIBIT E

sity jurisdiction on federal courts, and diversity unquestionably existed, Court of
Appeals would treat complaint as diversity
claim, though amendment to assert diversity basis of jurisdiction was denied in trial
court 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332, 1653.
4. Fraud <s=>41
Plaintiffs complaint stating that manufacturer of can opener alleged to have
caused fire, was not candid in answering
interrogatory, as to number of complaints
it had received involving fires allegedly
caused by can opener, and stating that
manufacturer's failure to provide truthful
response prevented plaintiff from presenting to jury fact that can opener fires were
common and serious problem known to
manufacturer, was sufficient to state cause
of action for fraud.
5. Federal Civil Procedure <®=>2642
Time limit in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure permitting relief from final judgment, on motion made within one year, for
fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of adverse party did not apply to
independent actions also permitted by rule.
Fe&Rules Civ.Proc.Rules 60, 60(b), (b)(6),
60 note, 28 U.S.C.A.
6. Judgment <s=>440
Elements of cause of action for relief
from judgment on the ground of fraud, in
independent action, were not different from
those elements needed in motion for relief
from judgment for fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of adverse party,
and, in independent action brought more
than one year after one-year time limit for
motion for relief from judgment, plaintiff
was not required to establish fraud on
court Fed.Rules Civ.ProcRules 60, 60(b),
(bX6), 60 note, 28 U.S.C.A.
7. Federal CouiU 4-313
In view of existence of diversity jurisdiction between plaintiff and defendant,
district court had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs independent action for
relief from judgment on ground of fraud.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1332.
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John J. O'Brien, III (argued), Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.
William T. Campbell, Jr. (argued), Robert
B; Mulhern, Jr., Swartz, Campbell & Detweiler, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.
Before GIBBONS, Chief Judge,
BECKER, Circuit Judge and BROWN,
District Judge.*
OPINION OF THE COURT
GIBBONS, Chief Judge:
Sylvia Averbach appeals from an order
dismissing, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b),
her complaint seeking relief from a judgment The judgment from which she seeks
relief was entered in favor of the defendants in a product liability action in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Averbach v.
Rival Manufacturing Company, Civil No.
78-1350, following a jury verdict on June 5,
1981. No appeal was taken from that judgment On September ,28, 1984 Averbach
filed a Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion seeking a
new trial. That motion was denied because
it was filed more than a year after the
judgment from which relief was sought,
and this court affirmed on November 1,
1985c While the appeal was pending this
separate action was filed in May, 1985. It
pleads two counts: violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq. (1982 & Supp.
Ill 1985) (RICO), and common law fraud.
We hold that the RICO count fails to state
a claim upon which Averbach may obtain
relief from a judgment We also hold that
the common law fraud count would permit
proof of facts which could afford relief
from a judgment, that there was subject
matter jurisdiction of that count, and that
it should not have been dismissed at the
pleading stage.
I.
In the underlying action Averbach
sought to recover damages resulting from
* Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr., United States
District Judge for the District of New Jersey,
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a fire in her home which, she claimed, was
caused by a defective Rival electric can
opener. During discovery in that action
Averbach served on Rival Manufacturing
Company an interrogatory asking:
If the Defendant has within the past
five years received any complaints of an
occurrence similar to that allegedly experienced by the Plaintiff, please state for
each such complaint
(a) Its date;
(b) Its substance, including a description of the factual circumstances;
(c) The name and address of the person making the complaint
Plaintiffs Interrogatories, Civ. No. 781350 at 10. Rival Manufacturing Company, on July 1, 1979, responded:
(a) December 7, 1976.
(b) The claim was for property damage
to a house. It was alleged that a Rival
Model 731/1 Can Opener/Knife Sharpener caused a fire. The evidence did not
support the claimant's allegations, the
claim was denied by the Company and
dropped by the claimant
(c) This was a subrogation claim by
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company,
5725 Foxridge Drive, Shawnee Mission,
Kansas 66202.
Defendant Rival's Answers to Plaintiffs
Interrogatories, Civ. No. 78-1350 at 5-6.
No other occurrence was disclosed. A similar interrogatory served on Rival Manufacturing Company by a cross-claimant, the
retail seller of the can opener, S. Klein
Department Stores, was answered identically. Thus Averbach was informed of a
single fire damage claim, made on behalf
of a fire insurer, which that insurer apparently dropped after inquiry. At trial the
jury decided in favor of the defendant
In the instant action the complaint alleges th£t in August, 1983 Averbach's counsel
learned that the Consumer Products Safety
Commission had information about Rival
sitting by designation.
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electric can openers causing fires. Counsel
obtained copies of the Commission's
records which disclosed that between 1968
and 1974 Rival Manufacturing Company
received 23 complaints of fires, 22 of which
involved Rival electric can openers. In
1975 two more fires were brought to Rival's attention and in 1976 two others were
reported. In addition, after the date of the
answer to the interrogatory but before trial
Rival received reports of fires started by
can openers in California, Chicago, and
Philadelphia. All of these reports indicated
that the arrangement of the electric switch
was such that the device remained on at
low speed when not in use, causing a heat
buildup to the point of combustion.
If the information from the files of the
Consumer Products Safety Commission
about fires begun by Rival electric can
openers is true, the answers to interrogatories served in the underlying action are
grossly false. Rival would have had complaints, as of July 1, 1979, of at least 26
similar occurrences, not the one incident
that was disclosed. The complaint alleges
that, had truthful answers been given, Averbach's presentation to the jury would
have been much stronger, and could have
produced a different verdict.
II.
In Count I Averbach alleges that by
serving through the mails its false answers
to interrogatories, Rival Manufacturing
Company engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity, thereby corrupting an enterprise, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
The theory of the complaint is that the
district court is an enterprise and that Rival Manufacturing Company, by serving
the false answers to interrogatories, participated in the conduct of that enterprise's
affairs, all within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c) (1982).

See United States v. Bacheler, 611 F.2(
443, 450 (3d Cir.1979) (Philadelphia Traffi<
Court); United States v. Herman, 58S
F.2d 1191 (3d Cir.1978), cert denied, 441
U.S. 913, 99 S.Ct 2014, 60 L.Ed.2d 386
(1979) (Pittsburgh Magistrates); United
States v. Vignola, 464 F.Supp. 1091, 1095
(E.D.Pa.), affd mem., 605 F.2d 1199 (3d
Cir.1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1072, 100
S.Ct 1015, 62 L.Ed.2d 753 (1980), (Philadelphia Traffic Court). In those cases in
which courts have been recognized as
RICO enterprises, however, the participants engaged in patterns of activities designed to corrupt the operation of the
courts' own processes. Whereas litigants
before courts call upon the courts to exercise the judicial process, they do not participate in it in the sense intended by Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982). Such
litigants do not share with the court's personnel a common purpose with respect to
the activity complained of. Indeed Averbach's allegations suggest that while those
responsible for conducting Rival Manufacturing Company's defense of product liability litigation may have had a common or
shared purpose, that purpose was quite at
variance with those of the judges and support personnel of the district court. If
Averbach's allegations are true, no more
occurred with respect to the enterprise in
question than to mislead those who conducted it. That is not, in our view, equivalent to the participation in its affairs which
is required by 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982).
Since Averbach's allegations fall short of
a charge that Rival Manufacturing Company participated in the affairs of the district
court, that court properly dismissed Count
I of her complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.1

[1,2] We agree that a court may be an
enterprise within the meaning of RICO.

III.
The district court, having dismissed the
RICO count as to which there was federal
question subject matter jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), treated Averbach's
common law fraud claim as a pendent state

1. Averbach did not plead, and does not here
contend that Rival Manufacturing Company's

affairs were conducted in such a manner as to
make Rival an enterprise for RICO purposes.
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law claim. That claim was dismissed based
on United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 US.
715, 726, 86 S.Ct 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d
218 (1966), which held that if federal claims
are dismissed before trial, pendent state
claims ordinarily should be dismissed as
well. Thereafter Averbach moved to
amend her complaint to rely upon diversity
jurisdiction. The district court ruled that
leave to amend was required because a
Rule 12(b) motion had already been granted See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). In deciding
the motion, the court considered whether
the complaint as amended would survive a
motion to dismiss, and concluded that it
would not Thus, purporting to apply the
pleading standard of Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41,78 S.Ct 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), the
court ruled that the complaint failed to
state a claim on which relief from a judgment could be obtained on the ground of
common law fraud.
[3] In our view, leave to amend probably was not required because the complaint, although mentioning only 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1982) and 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982),
on its face may satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1982), which confers diversity jurisdiction
on the federal courtSo It alleges that Averbach is a citizen of Pennsylvania and the
amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. It
pleads Rival's address in Kansas City, Missouri and refers to the underlying action
which was a diversity suit Thus Averbach's motion to amend may have been
surplusage. Whether or not it was necessary, however, the motion must be considered in light of the direction that
"[d]efective allegations of jurisdiction may
be amended, upon terms, in the trial or
appellate courts." 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (1982).
Since there unquestionably is diversity jurisdiction, and Rival Manufacturing Company always was aware of that fact, we will
treat the complaint accordingly.
[4] The next question we must address,
therefore, is whether the complaint states a
claim upon which relief from the instant
judgment can be obtained on the ground of
fraud. The district court, citing Thomas v.
Seaman, 451 Pa. 347, 304 A.2d 134 (1973),
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referred to the five standard elements of a
cause of action for fraud: (1) a misrepresentation of fact, (2) fraudulently uttered,
(3) with intent to induce reliance, (4) and
inducing justifiable reliance, (5) and to the
injury of the injured party. The court concluded that "[t]he complaint fails to allege
that defendants intended to induce action
on the part of the plaintiff or that plaintiff
justifiably relied upon the alleged misrepresentations." Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co.,
Civ. No. 85-2794 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 12, 1986)
[Available on WESTLAW, DCTU database]. We cannot agree. The complaint
explains that Averbach's theory in the underlying case, supported by the report of
the Fire Marshal who investigated the fire,
was that the fire started when a defective
switch in the Rival electric can opener permitted the unit to continue operating when
not in use, causing heat and ultimately
combustion. It explains further that in the
discovery stage, through the interrogatory
quoted above, it sought information that is
patently relevant to that theory, that Rival
Manufacturing Company had such information in its possession with respect to 26
incidents consistent with that theory, and
that the answer falsely referred only to
one. It is literally true that the complaint
does not allege in haec verba that the interrogatories were served for the purpose of
obtaining information for use in the preparation or presentation of Averbach's case,
that Rival Manufacturing Company knew
of such purpose, and that Rival Manufacturing intended to cause Averbach to rely
on its false answer. After alleging that
Rival was aware of facts inconsistent with
that answer, however, the complaint
charges:
33. It is clear from the foregoing evidence that Rival was not candid with the
Plaintiff during the discovery process.
34. Had Rival been truthful in its answers to Interrogatories the Plaintiffs
could have presented to the jury the fact
that the Rival can opener fires were a
common and serious problem known to
Rival.
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Plaintiffs Complaint, Civ. No. 85-2794 at
19. We find unpersuasive the proposition
that the complaint was deficient in failing
to allege the self-evident purpose of asking
for information under penalty of false
swearing in the course of discovery, or the
self-evident purpose of responding to a request for such information. As the complaint alleges, "[t]he acts and omissions of
defendant described herein plainly constitute a scheme or artifice reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension." IcL at 20.
Thus the district court's reason for finding
the fraud count to be legally insufficient
cannot be accepted.2
Alternatively, on the authority of Rule
60(bX3), the district court reasoned that in
an independent action seeking relief from a
judgment brought more than a year after
the one year time limit in Fed.R.Civ.P.
60(b), the plaintiff should have to prove
more than would be appropriate for relief,
within that period. That part of Rule 60
permits relief from a final judgment, on
motion made within one year, for "fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic
or extrinsic) misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party." Fed.R.
Civ.P. 60(b)(3). The court reasoned that
unless something more was required in actions commenced more than one year after
judgment, the one year limitation on Rule
60(bX3) relief would be seriously compromised. Therefore, the court concluded, no
independent action could be entertained for
relief from a judgment after one year except for "fraud on the court" as distinguished from fraud on a party. Moreover,
fraud on the court "did not include perjury," which is essentially what Averbach
alleged, but only egregious misconduct that
involves corruption of the judicial process
itself.
2. In determining whether a complaint states a
cause of action we are bound to consider not
only the statements in the pleading itself but
also to draw reasonable inferences in favor of
the pleader. Quinones v. United States, 492 F.2d
1269, 1273 (3d Cir.1974). Here we infer that
defendants are alleged to have made their false
statements with the intention of inducing plain*

[5] There are several problems v
this line of reasoning. The first is texti
The one year limit in Rule 60(b) appi
only to three of six listed grounds for rel
from judgment: (1) mistake, inadverten
surprise, or excusable neglect, (2) nev
discovered evidence, and (3) fraud. It dc
not apply to the catchall provision coverii
"any other reason justifying relief from t
operation of the judgment." Fed.R.Civ.
60fl>X6). Moreover Rule 60 provides th
"[t]his rule does not limit the power of
court to entertain an independent action 1
relieve a party from a judgment, order, (
proceeding . . . , or to set aside a judgmei
for fraud upon the court" Thus the on
year time limit in the rule, by virtue of th
rule's very text, does not apply to indepen
dent actions. The Note of the Advisor
Committee on Rules is quite clear in this
respect
If the right to make a motion is lost by
the expiration of the time limits fixed in
these rules, the only other procedural
remedy is by a new or independent action
to set aside a judgment upon those principles which have heretofore been applied
in such an action. Where the independent action is resorted to, the limitations
of time are those of laches or statutes of
limitations.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) advisory committee note.
The laches or statute of limitations to
which the Advisory Committee Note refers
are to the governing time bars under the
law which give rise to the independent
cause of action.
Nor does the rule purport to specify either the "other reasons justifying relief
from the operation of a judgment" or the
substantive rules which may authorize a
court in an independent action to grant
relief from a judgment The reason for the
absence of such a specification is plain.
tiff to rely detrimentally thereon. We are therefore unwilling to hold that this complaint does
not state a cause of action for purposes of Rule
12(b)(6). Upon remand plaintiff may wish to
consider amending her complaint by pleading
fraud with greater particularity. See Fed.R.
Civ.P. 9(b).
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Prior to the adoption of Rule 60 both the
substantive and the procedural law dealing
with relief from judgment were complex.
The Advisory Committee
endeavored [in 1946] to amend the rules
to permit, either by motion or by independent action, the granting of various
kinds of relief from judgments which
were permitted in the federal courts prior to the adoption of these rules, and the
amendment concludes with a provision
abolishing the use of bills of review and
the other common law writs referred to,
and requiring the practice to be by motion or by independent action.
Id The change in 1946 thus was intended
to eliminate the procedural complexities of
the former practice, while preserving two
alternative remedies, a motion or an independent action.
Prior to 1946, fraud was not an express
ground for a Rule 60(b) motion, and a dispute arose over whether relief on that
ground could be obtained by motion Rule
60(b)(3) was added in that year, and the
advisory committee explained;
The amendment settles this problem by
making fraud an express ground for relief by motion; and under the saving
clause, fraud may be urged as a basis for
relief by independent action insofar as
established doctrine permits.
Id. The advisory committee reference to
established doctrine is to the substantive
law, found elsewhere than in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, for relief from
judgment
It should be noted that Rule 60(b) does
not assume to define substantive law as
to the grounds for vacating judgments,
but merely prescribes the practice in proceedings to obtain relief.
Id. Neither the text of Rule 60(b) nor its
legislative history permits a construction
which would limit an independent action for
relief from a judgment to "fraud on the
court" as distinguished from fraud of some
other sort Indeed such an attempt by the
rulemakers to affect rights claimed under
the substantive law would probably have
exceeded the authority conferred in the
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Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1982). See Burbank, Interjurisdictional
Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and
Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 Cornell L.Rev. 733, 772 (1986).
One may reasonably ask what was the
purpose of the drafters in subjecting Rule
60(b)(1), (2) and (3) motions to a one year
time limit if not to create a substantive
time bar. The answer, as is so often the
case with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, lies in the former practice. Prior to
their adoption, there were terms of court,
and certain common law methods of obtaining relief from judgments were deemed to
be unavailable after the expiration of the
term at which the judgment was entered.
E.g.f United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55,
35 S.Ct 16, 59 L.Ed. 129 (1914). When
both the terms of court and the common
law writs were abolished, the time limit
with respect to some motion equivalents of
the former common law writs was substituted. See 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2866, at
227 n. 66 (1973). Under the old practice,
however, the expiration of the term of
court had no effect upon the timeliness of
an independent action for relief from judgment. The rule carries forward this same
principle. "The motion procedure is subject to a one year limit, which does not
apply to the independent action for fraud."
Id. § 2868, at 240.
[6] Additionally, the separate treatment
in Rule 60 of the somewhat confusing concept of "fraud on the court" as a distinct
ground for relief is traceable to the wellknown decision in Hazel-Atlas Glass Company v. Hartford-Empire Company, Z22
U.S. 238, 248-49, 64 S.Ct 997, 1002-03, 88
L.Ed. 1250 (1944), modified in Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 97
S.Ct 31, 50 L.Ed.2d 21 (1976) (per curiam),
in which it was held that a court has inherent power to set aside a judgment obtained
by such a fraud, even in circumstances
where the adverse party might be barred
by laches or lack of diligence from obtaining relief. As the advisory committee explains:
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(T]he rule expressly does not limit the
power of the court, when fraud has been
perpetrated upon it, to give relief under
the saving clause. As an illustration of
this situation, see Hazel-Atlas Glass Co.
v. Hartford-Empire Co. ...
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). What is required to
trigger the court's inherent power to grant
relief even when equitable principles might
bar a party from such relief has been a
matter of controversy.
Perhaps the principal contribution of all
these attempts to define 'fraud on the
court' and to distinguish it from mere
'fraud' is as a reminder that there is a
distinction. Any fraud connected with
the presentation of a case to a court is a
fraud upon the court, in the broad sense.
That cannot be the sense in which the
term is used in the final saving clause of
Rule 60(b). The remedy for most cases
of fraud must continue to be by motion
under Rule 60(b)(3) or by an independent
action, subject to the procedural limitations applicable to those remedies.
11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 2870, at 253 (1973) (footnotes omitted). Something more than ordinary fraud may be required in order to
trigger the court's authority to disregard
limitations on available relief in an independent action or equitable defenses to an
independent action for relief from a judgment The Hazel-Atlas rule, however, otherwise has nothing to do with the elements
of a cause of action for such relief.
Rule 60(b)(3) covers all fraud "whether
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic." No similar language appears in the
saving clause which preserves the independent action. Its absence has led some
courts to conclude that if relief from a
judgment is sought by an independent action the old distinction between "extrinsic"
and "intrinsic" fraud persists.3 A leading
commentator notes, however, that
(The distinction] is most unfortunate, if
true. [It] rests on cloudy and confused
3. See e.g., Dowdy v. Hawfteld, 189 F.2d 637
(D.GCir.), cert denied, 342 VS. 830, 72 S.Ct. 54,

authorities, its soundness as a matter <
policy is very doubtful, and it is extremi
ly difficult to apply. It ought not t
persist as a limit on independent action
now that it has been abolished on mc
tions.
11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 2868, at 240-41 (1973
(footnotes omitted). Moreover, the "extrin
sic"—"intrinsic" distinction which is basec
on a statement in United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 61, 25 L.Ed. 93
(1878), was overruled, if it was ever the
law, by Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589,
12 S.Ct 62, 35 L.Ed. 870 (1891). The distinction probably would not in any event
survive Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed.
1188 (1938), and Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed.
2079 (1945), at least with respect to judgments in diversity cases. As Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York makes clear, there is no
longer a federal substantive law of equitable remedies. Id. Furthermore, even
before the 1946 amendment to Rule 60(b),
which added Rule 60(b)(3), the extrinsic-intrinsic fraud distinction was rejected by
this court. Publicker v. Shallcross, 106
F.2d 949, 950 (3d Cir.1939), cert denied,
308 U.S. 624, 60 S.Ct. 379, 84 LEA 521
(1940). See also Bandai America Inc. v.
Bally Midway Mfg. Co., 775 F.2d 70, 73 (3d
Or.1985), cert denied, — U.S.
, 106
S.Ct 1265, 89 LEd.2d 574 (1986); Schum
v. Bailey, 578 F.2d 493, 506 (3d Cir.1978)
(Gibbons, J., concurring). Thus we must
reject Rival Manufacturing Company's argument, in support of the order appealed
from, that its fraud, if any, was intrinsic.
[7] Summarizing, we hold that Count II
of Averbach's complaint, measured against
the pleading standards of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct 99, 2 LEd.2d 80
(1957), would permit proof of facts which
would authorize relief from a judgment on
the ground of fraud. We hold further that
the elements of a cause of action for such
96 L.Ed. 628 (1951).
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relief in an independent action are not different from those elements in a Rule
60(bX3) motion, and that the time limit on
such a motion does not apply to an independent action.4 Moreover, since there is diversity of citizenship, there is a separate
basis for subject matter jurisdiction over
Averbach's independent action. Thus we
need not consider whether an independent
action for relief from a judgment falls
within the ancillary jurisdiction of a federal
court which rendered the judgment
Given these holdings with respect to
Count II, we have considered whether the
prior ruling of the district court denying
Averbach's Rule 60(bX3) motion, which this
court affirmed, might afford a separate
ground for affirmance* We hold that it
does not That ruling was predicated sole*
ly upon the timeliness of the motion. The
legal sufficiency of the claim of fraud was
not addressed. The time bar in Rule 60, as
we have held, has no application to this
lawsuit
IV.
The judgment appealed from will be affirmed insofar as it dismissed Averbach's
Count I RICO claim. It will be reversed
insofar as it dismissed Averbach's common
law fraud Count II, and the case will be
remanded for further proceedings on that
count

(o
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•. Judge Becker agrees that the fraud alleged in
this case could be redressed in an independent
action. Further, he confesses his inability to see
any basis for distinguishing the elements of a
60(b)(3) action from those of an independent
action. The only possible basis Judge Becker
can envision for such a distinction is the difference between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud.
This circuit has established, however, that the
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A grand jury witness refused to comply with an order compelling him to provide
samples of his handwriting in a backward
slant The United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey, Maryanne
Trump Barry, J., adjudged witness in civil
contempt, and witness appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Mansmann, Circuit
Judge, held that compelling grand jury witness to provide normal handwriting exemplars with a backward slant when backhand
was concededly not his normal writing
style was not a testimonial communication
for purposes of Fifth Amendment protection.
Affirmed.
Becker, J., filed dissenting opinion.
Higginbotham and Becker, JJ., would
grant rehearing in banc.
1. Witnesses <3=>297(6)
Compelling a grand jury witness to
provide "normal" handwriting exemplars
with a ''backward slant" would not constitute a testimonial admission, i.e., that the
witness would choose to slant his handwriting at a certain angle when disguising it,
for purposes of the Fifth Amendment
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 5.
distinction is chimerical. See Publicker v. Shallcross, 106 FJd 949 (3d Cir.1939), cert denied,
308 VS. 624, 60 S.Ct. 379, 84 L.Ed. 521 (1940).
Nonetheless, Judge Becker is not certain that
the elements of an independent action to reopen
a judgment for fraud are always identical to the
elements of a 60(b)(3) action, as Judge Gibbons
appears to hold. Judge Becker would prefer to
reserve that issue.
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